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SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY

by

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June 1984

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This paper examines South African defense policy as it
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Historical development of the South African Defense Force
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placed upon South Africa, and the country's assets. Lastly,
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response to these factors.

South African Defense Policy

by

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A. BACKGROUND: TO 1948[1]

South Africa's regular defense force, the Union Defense
Force (UDF) was established by the Defense Act of 1912, two
years after the Act of Union. In developing the plans for
an effective defense force, General Jan C. Smuts, an Afrikaner
hero of the Boer War, relied on the military traditions of
both the Afrikaner and the English-speaking segments of the
country's white population. In the case of the Afrikaners,
these traditions reflected the Boer "Commandos," which
developed as a sort of frontier militia in the defense of the
early settlers, and which had grown into the military arm of
the Boer Republics. The military traditions of the English-
speaking whites derived from the colonial period when British
troops were garrisoned in Cape Province and Natal. The
Volunteer Ordinance of 1854 created a militia in these two
colonies which trained in accordance with British procedures
and were often affiliated with regular army regiments sta-
tioned in southern Africa.

Initially, the permanent force of the UDF consisted of
about 2500 men organized into headquarters, a training staff,
five artillery batteries, and five mounted rifle regiments.
In addition, the Active Citizens' Force (ACF) numbered
25,000 reservists serving four year tours in fifteen mounted

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rifle regiments and fourteen infantry regiments. Finally, the Defense Act provided for reserve coast artillery batteries, a small flying corps, and a naval reserve. It also reinstated the Commandos as a separate voluntary reserve formation.

The UDF's first operation took place in January 1914, when thousands of reservists were mobilized to maintain order in Witwatersrand during a miner's strike. In World War I, the Union government mobilized reserves for operations against German Southwest Africa, an action which led to much Afrikaner opposition, the resignation of many Afrikaner officers (some of whom organized an armed uprising against the Union), and the defection of an Afrikaner UDF unit to the Germans. It took two months for loyal forces to deal with the Afrikaner rebellion, which pitted pro-Union and anti-British Commandos against one another.

Once internal problems were settled, the UDF turned to Southwest Africa, which was captured in a six month campaign in 1915. In addition, the Union launched a recruiting drive to raise a volunteer expeditionary force, which eventually served the Allied cause in Egypt against pro-Ottoman Arabs, in Palestine against the Turks, and in German East Africa and Europe against the Germans. In addition to white combat troops, 60,000 colored auxiliaries and 25,000 black laborers saw service in World War I.

Between World War I and World War II, a lack of commitment of funds to defense restricted the development of South

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Africa's armed forces. After demobilization, reserve levels were kept at about 15,000 men, but reduced pay scales eroded the ranks of the regulars. The last units of the British Army were withdrawn in 1921, although the Royal Navy retained its bases at Simonstown and Walvis Bay. Due to the Afrikaner uprising during World War I, it was 1934 before ACF regiments were formed which used Afrikans as the language of command.

In 1922, the ACF was again mobilized to deal with miners' strikes at Witwatersrand. In addition, the armed forces were deployed on several occasions to deal with tribal rebellions in Southwest Africa, which had been mandated to South Africa by the League of Nations.

World War II again saw a split between Afrikaners and English-speakers over participation in the war, and a proposal for "qualified neutrality" was narrowly defeated in Parliament. The decision to enter the war had the effect of turning Smuts' Union Party into the party of English speakers and of aligning the majority of Afrikaner speakers against him. It was the issue of participation in the war with Britain which provided the impetus which led to a National Party victory in 1948.[2]

During the war, South African troops saw service against the Italians in Italian Somaliland, with the British Eighth Army in Egypt and Libya, in Italy, and against the Vichy French in the occupation of Madagascar. In addition, 3000 South African naval personnel were seconded to the Royal

Navy, and the South African air arm served with distinction in many theaters of operations.

The defeat of General Smuts in the 1948 elections brought to an end an era in South African politics, and saw the beginning of another, both for South Africa in general and for the UDF in particular. Four important points must be made about defense policy and the pre-1948 defense establishment. First, other than the employment of forces in the two World Wars, which were exceptions, the military establishment during this period was politically insignificant and militarily weak. At the time of South Africa's decision to enter World War II, the UDF consisted of only 313 officers and 3040 other ranks in the Permanent Force (PF), 1900 in the Air Force, and 432 in the Navy, and the Defense Force had no role in Union politics.[3] Second, the UDF was identified as an institution very much dominated by the English speaking portion of the white population. Third, the precedent of the use of the UDF by the Union government to maintain internal order in the 1914 and 1922 labor disputes and against native unrest between the wars was established. Finally, the participation of South Africa in wars outside of the Union and southern Africa proved a divisive issue among South Africa's white population, and eventually was a factor in the coalesce of Afrikaners in the National Party, and in the ascension of that party to power in 1948.

B. 1948-1960

1. Background

The 1948 elections in South Africa brought to power the coalition of the Nationalist Party (NP) and the Afrikaner Party (later absorbed into the NP). From this point on, governments controlled by a growing NP majority sought tc implement the apartheid policy and ensure Afrikaner control of the government through legislation and regulation. While a survey of the actual implementation of apartheid is beyond the scope of this paper, it is important to note that from 1948 onwards, South African foreign and security policies have been explicitly and implicitly concerned with the protection of this internal policy, making South Africa a country whose foreign relations are determined almost entirely by a domestic political and social policy.[4]

The ultimate foreign policy goals of the first NP government of Dr. D. F. Malan were first discussed in his 1945 "African Charter." This document called for the preservation of Africa for "Western European Christian Civilization."[5] It proposed to keep both Asiatics and Communists out of Africa and to forbid the arming of "natives" and their use in white wars.

2. Defense Policy

As the new South African NP government worked to improve its hold on the government and implement apartheid internally, its leaders also sought to frame a basic strategy

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for external defense.[6] While there appeared to be a little threat of outside attack, growing black nationalism, which was seen as a direct result of Communist agitation and part of a global Communist plan to weaken the West through denial of southern Africa's strategic resources, was of much concern.

In defining its strategy, the governments of Malan, and of his successor, J. G. Strijdon, made several strategic assumptions.[7] First, that South Africa would be a welcome ally of the West due to its strategic position, economic resources, and white, Christian, anti-communist government. Second, that the colonial powers would give a major role to South Africa in African regional affairs. Third, that the colonial powers would defend the status quo in Africa, and that decolonization would be piecemeal, selective, and take many years. Finally, that South Africa was a "small power" and that the main burden of defending Africa must fall to the Western powers.[8]

Based on these assumptions, the South African government developed a two-fold strategy. First, in the event of war against Communism the enemy must be engaged as far from South Africa as possible. Second, South Africa attempted to become involved in a formal Western defense alliance to ensure Western commitment to the defense of Africa.

In view of its strategic assumptions and the strategy which resulted from these assumptions, South Africa undertook policies designed to draw closer to the West. South Africa

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undertook policies designed to draw closer to the West. South Africa demonstrated its willingness to embark on anti-Communist missions by providing small but symbolic forces to participate in the Berlin airlift and in the Korean War. Further, South Africa applauded the development of Western defense agreements such as the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), and the Australia-New Zealand-United States (ANZUS) agreement, and continued lobbying for NATO to extend its coverage into the South Atlantic.[9] In addition, as early as 1951, Malan was promoting the concept of an African defense organization to include South Africa and the colonial powers in Africa. In 1951 South Africa joined Britain in sponsoring a defense conference in Nairobi, and participated in another at Dakar in 1954. However, in spite of South African statements to the contrary, nothing concrete regarding strategic planning came of either of these meetings.[10] In the early 1950's, South Africa also supported Britain in an attempt to develop a Middle East Defense Organization (MEDO). This led to the purchase of Centurion tanks and Sabre jet aircraft as a potential contribution to this alliance. However, MEDO was also abandoned.[11]

The closest South Africa came to obtaining a Western defense commitment was the Simonstown Agreement with Britain in 1955, whereby both the British and South African governments agreed in general terms to contribute forces for the defense of southern Africa against external aggression. The

British naval base at Simonstown was turned over to South Africa, and South Africa in turn made a commitment to expand its navy to assist in the defense of the Cape sea route.[12]

3. The Changing South African Defense Force

This period brought two major changes to the South African Defense Force (SADF). First, the ascension of the National Party to power in 1948 brought an accompanying "Afrikanerization" throughout the government, including both the defense forces and the police. Government institutions, including the SADF, were converted into apartheid institutions to strengthen the party's hold on the state. British trained, English speaking officers were retired early and replaced with Afrikaners. A Defense Amendment Act required fluency in both English and Afrikaans of all officers and non-commissioned officers, and for all members of the Permanent Force. These moves had the effect of decreasing the influence of the English-speakers in the SADF, as they were less likely to be bilingual, and, for a time, lowering the combat efficiency of the SADF as veteran officers and NCO's were replaced by less experienced Afrikaners and as units with long traditions (normally associated with the English speaking community) lost their historic identity.[13]

Secondly, the Simonstown Agreement and attempts to participate in other Western alliancs brought the SADF its first modern equipment, albeit in small quantity. Tanks and aircraft were acquired for participation in the stillborn

MEDO, and modern warships and long range maritime patrol aircraft and strike aircraft to comply with the Simonstown Agreement. While defense spending remained low, these acquisitions were the first new major equipment acquired by the SADF since the end of World War II.

   4. Summary 1948-1960

      The salient points to be made from the discussion of this period center around South Africa's key strategic assumptions. First, some of the perceptions upon which the National Party leaders based their developing foreign policy strategy would evolve into the basis for current South African foreign policy strategy. These perceptions were: 1) That South Africa could be a valuable ally to the West; 2) That South Africa's strategic location and economic importance would be of value to the West; 3) That South Africa was an important player in southern Africa; and, 4) That decolonization would be selective and time consuming.

      Several of these key assumptions turned out to be false. Other than the Simonstown Agreement, which was not a full-fledged treaty but a series of letters of agreement, South Africa was never able to generate much Western enthusiasm for defense agreements. Western interests at the time were focused on Europe, and southern Africa seemed far removed and of small importance.[14] Further, doubts among the colonial powers concerning the viability of the colonial system caused Western nations to refrain from becoming too closely associated

with South Africa, thus affording little hope of a defense alliance and small role for South Africa in regional colonial affairs.[15] Finally, once decolonization did come, it came with a rush which was unexpected not only in South Africa, but in the rest of the world.

C. 1960-1973 GROWING ISOLATION

1. Background

a. Internal Security

The first years of the 1960's caused the over-riding concern for South Africa to become one of internal security. This period opened with what was seen as the first major threat of black insurrection in South Africa, brought about by the shooting of African demonstrators by South African police units at Sharpeville on 21 March 1960. The disorders which followed lasted until mid-April and led the government to declare a state of emergency. Eventually, more than 11,000 people were detained.[16]

In the wake of Sharpeville, African resistance to white policies turned to violence. Resistance movements such as Umkhonto we Size (Spear of the Nation) and Poqo (We Alone) grew up as offshoots of the African National Congress (ANC) and Pan-African Congress (PAC).[17] From August 1961 to July 1963, 193 acts of sabotage were recorded in South Africa.[18]

For its part, by 1963 the South African govern-ment had penetrated and destroyed much of the underground

resistance. In its efforts in this direction, the South

African Police (SAP) were aided by a series of harsh security

laws passed beginning in 1961. During this period, spanning

from 1961 to the passage of the Terrorism Act of 1967, South

Africa moved away from the protection of individual rights

guaranteed under British law to regulations under which the

powers of the State were greatly increased. By 1964 incidents

of sabotage dropped from 100 a year to 10, and by 1965 inter-

nal resistance had disappeared.[19] All the while, the South

African government denied the country's internal troubles

were related to the racial policies of apartheid, instead

claiming incidents like Sharpeville were initiated by "sub-

versive, communist and liberal elements outside South Africa."[20]

b. External Pressures

The rush of decolonization in the early 1960's

led to the establishment of black ruled states throughout

Africa, and the sheer number of these states gave them con-

siderable diplomatic weight at the United Nations. Change

for South Africa was signalled beginning in 1961, when these

new countries joined with India, Pakistan, and Ceylon to

give South Africa little choice but to withdraw from the

British Commonwealth. This marked the first step in the

isolation and inward turning of South Africa.[21]

In 1963, a new source of danger for South Africa

came into being with the formation of the Organization of

African Unity (OAU). At its first meeting, this organization

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resolved to provide arms and assistance to launch guerrilla wars against colonial and white minority governments in Africa.[22] Although this threatened action turned out to be easier said than done, formation and rise of the African bloc in the United Nations, coupled with the liberal wave which swept the West in the 1960's led to trouble for South Africa in the UN. In 1960, the United States supported a Security Council resolution against apartheid. In 1963, Britain voted for a General Assembly resolution favoring anti-apartheid actions by member states, and the next year the United Nations passed a voluntary arms embargo against the Republic.[23]

2. Foreign Policy

a. Verwoerd to 1965

As regional and international hostility to its domestic policies intensified, South Africa's leaders were forced to search for new strategies to cope with and, if possible, reverse their country's growing isolation. In 1959, Prime Minister Verwoerd embarked on the policy of separate development, providing Bantu homelands for blacks which were ultimately to become independent states. South Africa saw the Bantustan policy as a bridge between internal and external affairs, as "the first link in a chain which started in the Republic, led through the small neighboring black states, and then outward to the rest of the continent and the wider international community."[24] While this was a domestic policy, it obviously was influenced by foreign

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opinion. Verwoerd saw the Bantustan policy as a counter to
both African and international opposition to South Africa's
racial policies.[25]

Regionally, South Africa's focus narrowed to its
immediate neighbors. Verwoerd sought unsuccessfully to draw
the British territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland, and
Swaziland into the homelands plan. He also formulated plans
for a Southern African Common Market to include South Africa,
future independent homelands, and other countries as far
north as Zaire.[26] In putting forward the Common Market scheme,
the South African government assumed economic considerations
would become more important than political ones in relations
with black African countries, and emphasized South African
willingness to provide direct, bilateral aid to these
countries.

b. Vorster, 1966-1973

By the time B. J. Vorster succeeded Verwoerd as
Prime Minister in 1966, the troubles of the early 1960's had
been overcome. Verwoerd's politics of security had resulted
in the banning of domestic subversives (such as the ANC and
PAC), suppression of internal violence, and, most importantly,
restoration of white confidence.[27] The internal stability
achieved within the country soon gave Vorster maneuvering room
to expand upon what had been a cautious policy towards black
African nations. The "Outward Movement" was launched in
hopes of improving South Africa's foreign relations overall

through a rapprochement within Africa. The Outward Movement was, from South Africa's viewpoint, essentially an externally oriented policy. Importantly, this policy implicitly denied that any domestic change was required.[28]

The Outward Movement enjoyed some initial success in 1967, when South Africa established diplomatic ties with Malawi. In addition, South Africa was finally able to make good on long-standing offers of aid to black nations. In retrospect, however, it is apparent this policy could never have achieved the success hoped for by Vorster. Contacts were made and economic relations encouraged with many African states, but the fact that most of these states based their relations with South Africa on the condition that there would be change in the Republic's internal policies did not mesh with the South African perception that Outward Movement policies were independent of domestic linkages. In addition, there are some indications that Vorster himself may have lacked sustained interest in the Outward Movement.[29]

By the early 1970's strong black opposition to any rapprochement with South Africa, as expressed in the Lusaka Manifesto of April 1969 and the Mogadishu Declaration of October 1971, made it apparent to South Africa that the Outward Movement had failed.[30] The Portuguese Coup of April 1974 and the ensuing South African intervention in Angola effectively marked an end to the Outward Movement as a policy, although South Africa still attempted rapprochement

with individual black states such as Mozambique in 1975.
In addition, Vorster continued to pressure the Smith regime
in Rhodesia to come to a negotiated settlement, both to gain
possible influence among other African nations and to try and
prevent the establishment of another black radical state on
the Republic's borders. However, in spite of these indi-
vidual diplomatic efforts, 1975 marked the beginning of a
new phase in South African foreign policy. South Africa was
not slow to recognize the potential consequences of a Portu-
guese withdrawal from its African holdings, and from this
point on, the Republic concentrated on consolidating its
position in southern Africa.[31]

3. South African Defense Policy 1960-1973

    a. Threat Perception

        The period 1960-1973 was one of rapid change in
South African defense thought, beginning with the Sharpeville
disturbances and threats of internal revolution and ending
with increased white confidence and new feelings of military
and economic strength. In short, this era bridges what have
been described as the "Years of Crisis and Doubt" and the
"Years of Confidence."[32] It was during the years 1960-1964
that critical events occurred and judgments were made which
affected South African defense policy until the mid-1970's.
The events of the early 1960's caused South Africa's defense
policy to evolve from one which, in 1960, envisioned a response
to the threat of internal unrest to one which, by 1964,

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sought a broader response to both internal unrest and external attack. This external threat was vaguely defined at first but was eventually identified as mainly a terrorist or guerrilla threat.[33]

The evolution of policy can be seen in the actions of the South African government in the years between 1961 and 1964. In 1961 Defense Minister J. J. Fouche gave three general reasons for rises in defense spending and buildup in the SADF:[34] (1) to preserve internal security; (2) to have something to offer when South Africa wanted to enter military alliances with other countries, and; (3) to meet threats of external invasion. This general statement encompassed both recognition of the internal and the external threat, but it became apparent from the government's subsequent actions that much of the defense legislation introduced during early 1961 was aimed at strengthening internal security.[35]

By 1962, however, the external threat was more clearly outlined during South African House of Assembly debates. By now, the threat was seen to encompass three broad areas of danger:[36] (1) An attack by black states with Communist assistance. This was considered by Verwoerd the most dangerous possibility; (2) A major East-West conflict with South Africa involved on the West side. This was later dismissed as the likelihood of such a conflict diminished; (3) A combined international action against South Africa on the pretext of "enforcing international law."

While at this time it was not clear what shape the threat from black states would take, it soon became apparent that these states could not match the rising strength of the SADF, and the possibility of conventional attack began to seem more remote. By 1973, the majority of Defense Force training was aimed at counterinsurgency warfare.

Once the threat had been determined to be mainly an unconventional one, it became clear to Pretoria that it was one which could be handled. In 1971, this basic threat perception was further refined by P. W. Botha, who had assumed the Defense portfolio in 1965. He made the final link between the guerrilla threat and the global one, reasoning that, due to the nuclear stalemate between the superpowers, the Communists had been forced to change tactics in their quest for global domination. The first phase of this new "onslaught" had been to create internal unrest, and this had been the cause of South Africa's internal difficulties in the early 1960's. Botha further identified the threat as "...a total indirect strategy which is directed at us, and if and when it has achieved sufficient success, the final conventional confrontation will take place."[37]

Botha's statements in 1971 are an important precursor of the Total Onslaught/Total Strategy concept which he would bring to the Prime Minister's office.

By the time of the upheavals of the mid-1970's in southern Africa, South African defense objectives were

fairly well defined:[38] (1) to implement relations with Western or pro-Western countries and prevent total isolation; (2) to protect frontiers by maintaining close relations with Rhodesia and the Portuguese in Angola and Mozambique; (3) to continue attempts to gain a military alliance with NATO or the United States to counter Communist influence in the South Atlantic, Indian Ocean, or southern Africa.

    b.   Response

    (1) Background. With the increasing perception of threat that grew within the South African government in the early 1960's, there arose in the government a determination to meet the growing threat. When action was taken in 1961 to enlarge the Permanent Force and the Active Citizens' Force, even the opposition in Parliament supported the move. The Permanent Force grew from 9,000 in 1960 to 15,000 in 1964, and National Servicemen under training increased from 2,000 to nearly 20,000 during the same time period. By 1970, the total number of men in uniform, including Commandos and the South African Police (SAP) had grown to 130,000, and the annual intake of conscripts had reached 26,000 men.[39]

    For its part, the government defended its increasing expenditures and military buildup in terms of the rising threat, both internal and external. Verwoerd compared the military preparations to taking out an insurance policy-- saying a man does not expect to be injured, but covers himself for the unexpected.[40]

(2) <u>Defense Expenditures</u>. Until 1960 the SADF
had played only a minor role in South African planning,
and its budget during this time reflected its lack of signi-
ficance. Defense spending had totaled less than 7% of the
government budget and less than 1% of the Gross National
Produce (GNP).[41]

In the early 1960's defense costs rose
rapidly in total, as a percentage of government spending,
and as a percentage of GNP (see Table 1). In defending
the size of the increase in defense spending in the 1962
budget, the Minister of Finance called the entire national
budget a "budget of national security," adding, "...defense
is its dominant theme and its ultimate justification."[42]

TABLE 1[43]

South African Defense Spending 1960 to 1974

Financial Year	Defense Budget (million current R)	percent of Budget	percent of GNP	percent increase over previous year
1960/61	44	6.6	0.9	--
1961/62	61	10.0	NA	38
1962/63	120	NA	NA	96
1963/64	120	NA	NA	0
1964/65	230	21.0	NA	92
1965/66	219	NA	NA	NA
1966/67	248	19.0	NA	13
1967/68	256	NA	NA	3
1968/69	252	16.1	2.5	NA
1969/70	272	16.8	2.4	8
1970/71	257	13.0	NA	NA
1971/72	317	12.0	2.6	23
1972/73	335	12.0	2.3	6
1973/74	472	13.7	2.6	41

After the initial large increases, the middle part of the 1960's saw a leveling off in defense spending. From 1964 to 1973, the defense budget averaged 285 million current Rand a year. This leveling off was probably due to several causes:[44] (1) the terrorist threat seemed not to have increased, and there was the beginning of the shift in perception to the "years of confidence:" (2) the Minister of Defense was under pressure to reduce spending in line with changing threat perception, and; (3) the concern of South African economists caused by the burden of defense spending as a total share of government spending due to its inflationary tendency in an overheating economy, and due to its draw off of badly needed skilled technicians.

In spite of these limits on the defense budget, defense spending increased ten fold during this period, and at times approached 20 percent of all government spending. Had not the South African economy been in a period of rapid expansion, with a GNP increase of 140 percent between 1960 and 1970, it is unlikely this rapid growth in the defense sector could have been achieved without damaging economic strain and a decline in the white standard of living.[45]

(3) Manpower. Throughout the period 1960-1973, the availability of manpower became and remained a critical limitation on the expansion of the SADF. The Defense Force was not only limited by being forced to draw almost exclusively

on the nation's four million whites, but was also forced
to compete with the rapidly expanding private sector, which
also relied heavily on whites to fill technical and skilled
jobs.[46]

In order to fill the manpower requirements
of the expanding Defense Force, several steps were taken.
In 1967, in order to better compete with the private sector,
salaries in the SADF were increased 11 to 50 percent and
technical training opportunities were increased.[47] More
importantly, in 1968 the lottery, or selective system of
conscription was abolished and all physically able white males
were required to enter the National Service, which served
under the Permanent Force component for training. National
Service personnel were trained while serving on active
duty, and became available for later call up in a reserve
status in either Citizens' Force or Commando units[48] (see
Table 2).

TABLE 2[49]

South African Defense Force Composition

	Standing Forces		Reserve Forces	
Branch of Service	Permanent Force (career personnel)	National Servicemen (conscripts)	Citizens' Force (regular reserve)	Commandos (militia reserve)
Army	X	X	X	X
Navy	X	X	X	
Air Force	X	X	X	Limited number of units

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Another solution to the manpower shortage which was discussed was the large scale recruitment of non-whites. In 1963, the Cape Coloured Corps, which had been disbanded after World War II, was reestablished with white officers and coloured NCOs. The mission of the Cape Coloured Corps was to fulfill non-combat roles. In 1973, the Cape Corps Service Battalion was formed to train coloured volunteers at a rate of 200 a year, and plans were announced to form an Indian Service Battalion.[50]

More problematic for the government was the arming of blacks. In 1972, when the issue was raised in Parliament, Defense Minister Botha stated that while blacks served the SADF as civilians, it would be wrong to create a black military corps.[51] Action in this direction remained some years away.

(4) Arms and the Arms Industry. Through the 1950s, the SADF was dependent upon Britain for much of its material. Under the implicit division of defense responsibility which existed between Britain and South Africa, South Africa developed such defense industries as were required to supplement equipment procured from the United Kingdom. Thus, South African industry produced significant amounts of mortars, light to medium field artillery, armored cars, communications equipment, and ammunition, fuzes and bombs. Major hardware purchases were keyed to "allied" requirements, such as the antisubmarine warfare frigates acquired within the context

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of the 1955 Simonstown Agreement.[52] For the most part, prior

to 1960 the SADF's equipment featured outdated and obsolete

British and American aircraft, tanks, and armored cars.

Beginning in 1960, the rising pressure of new

African states at the United Nations for an arms embargo

against South Africa grew stronger each year, and the con-

cern over this pressure prompted Pretoria to take steps

towards ensuring its source of arms was secure. In spite of

the fact that the UN passed an arms embargo in 1963, South

Africa had little difficulty in obtaining the arms it needed

during this period, as only the United States and Britain

made any realistic effort to restrain the flow of military

goods, and in their cases, only on clearly military end

products, such as guns, tanks, and combat aircraft.[53] Britain

was rapidly replaced as South Africa's major arms supplier

by France and Italy.

South Africa's determination to modernize

and ensure the availability of arms, outlined in the 1960

General Staff review was rapidly carried forward.[54] To

promote local production and self-sufficiency, the Defense

Production Board was established in 1964, and the Defense

Council in 1966. The Board procured locally manufactured

arms while the Council was responsible for guiding and finan-

cing weapons research. A further important step was taken

in May 1968, when an Act of Parliament established the Armament

Development and Production Corporation (ARMSCOR), which was

funded with the equivalent of $144 million to "meet as effec-
tively and economically as feasible South Africa's armament
requirements..."[55] by initiating research and development
for domestic defense production. Later this came to include
buying abroad.[56]

By 1965, South Africa had acquired 127
licenses for the manufacture and assembly of foreign military
equipment ranging from French and Belgium small arms to
French armored cars and French and Italian aircraft.[57] How-
ever, in spite of these acquisitions, the key to assessing
the South African motive for expanding its domestic arms
production capability is to note that each step in arms
industry development was a result of Western actions to limit
arms supplies. Decisive for South Africa were the trade-offs
between the desire for Western links and the fear of being
cut off from arms supplies on one hand, and between the most
economic source and the most reliable source on the other.[58]
The SADF during this period opted for economy and Western
defense ties until it became apparent that Western arms
sources were no longer reliable.

(5) Defense Reorganization. As the Defense
Force grew between the years 1960-1973, it became necessary
to reconsider South Africa's command and control practices.
In September 1972, the Minister of Defense replaced the
Supreme Command, which had functioned as advisor to the Head
of the Defense Force, with a Defense Staff Council, headed

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by the Commandant General and made up of the General Officer Commanding Joint Combat Forces, Commander Maritime Defense and Chief of the Navy, Chief of Defense Staff, Chief of Air Force, Chief of Defense Force Administration, the Comptroller of the SADF, and the Surgeon General.[59]

In addition, the operational command was also reconfigured. Two commands were charged individually with ground and naval defense, incorporating of all three SADF branches in operations either on land or at sea.[60] In 1969, ground forces were further reorganized to better support the South African Police in opposing insurgency and terrorism. Army territorial divisions were rearranged to conform to police administrative divisions. Each region was placed under the command of a Permanent Force colonel, and was responsible for the coordination of Army reserve and civil defense actions. The army, through the Commando units, was made responsible for providing the SAP with operational support for counterinsurgency efforts. Commando units were expected to "ensure the immediate and continuous protection of their own home regions" at all times.[61]

(6) _Training_. As the size of the SADF increased, training facilities to handle the growing numbers of servicemen were strained. In response, specialized schools were established for each branch, such as the Commando Training Center, the Army College, and the Air Force College in order to standardize training and economize efforts. The

Permanent Force began to emphasize unconventional warfare techniques while conducting training. Commandos were trained in reconnaissance and unconventional warfare and were in some cases formed into specialized groups, such as Industrial or Urban Commando units.[62]

The largest training difficulty encountered was related to the manpower shortage. The Permanent Force had been responsible for training National Service inductees, but the Permanent Force represented the smallest part of the armed services and suffered, in addition, from chronic shortages of career personnel. The SADF was forced to supplement Permanent Force instructors with National Service-men, who were trained specifically to be instructors, and who served in that capacity for their entire service, even though this detracted from the number of troops actually available for operational duty.[63]

(7) The Security Establishment.

(a) The Bureau of State Security. As the escalating internal strife of the early 1960s brought new and more repressive laws to South Africa, it also brought the recognition that an improvement was needed in the government's security system. Discussions at the time be-tween the Minister of Justice Vorster and the Commissioner of Police led to the appointment of General Hendrik van den Bergh as head of the Security Police to reorganize the country's security set-up.[64]

Van den Bergh had been a close confi-
dent and advisor to Vorster since their internment together
during World War II. From the Security Police, he fashioned
a covert organization in the early 1960s which became known
as the Republican Intelligence. The function of this organi-
zation was to gather information both at home and abroad,
engage in espionage as required, and strengthen the hand of
the government.[65]

In 1969, the still clandestine Republi-
can Intelligence grew into a new department of state, known
as the Bureau of State Security (BOSS). While BOSS was in-
tended as a government agency to supplement the military
intelligence and the Security Police,[66] it soon became
apparent that van den Bergh, as a close associate and con-
fidant of now Prime Minister Vorster, wielded much informal
power. Van den Bergh became Vorster's crisis manager, and
BOSS became the clearing house for information gathered by
the other intelligence services.[67]

The system for control and implementation
of security operations which the South African government
employed, and which BOSS exemplified, reflected a lack of
coordination and lack of accountability which eventually
brought Vorster, van den Bergh, and others into disrepute.
However, in 1972 an alternative apparatus for security deci-
sion making was established which would later grow in impor-
tance. This was the State Security Council (SSC).[68]

(b) The Establishment of the State Security Council. In 1970, partially in response to charges of BOSS involvement in the monitoring of the Parliamentary opposition,[69] the Potgeiter Commission was ordered to investigate certain intelligence aspects of state security. As a result of recommendations made by this commission in 1972, the State Security Council was established by law, with bipartisan political support.[70]

The membership of the SSC was to consist of the Prime Minister, who would act as chairman, the Senior Minister of the Republic, the Minister of Defense, the Minister of Police, other Ministers as required, the Secretary for Security Intelligence, the Commandant-General of the SADF, the Secretary for Foreign Affairs, the Secretary for Justice, the Commissioner of the South African Police, and other heads of Departments as required.[71]

The Act which established the SSC also gave it a number of important sounding functions, such as formation of National Policy and Strategy, and responsibility for the execution of that strategy.[72] In practice, however, the SSC had little impact during its early years. It was only one of twenty cabinet committees to which Vorster paid little attention. The SSC met only occasionally, its agenda was not circulated, and no minutes were kept.[73] The growth in the importance of the SSC would come later, under Vorster's successor, P. W. Botha.

c. The Consequences of South African Defense
    Policy 1960-1973

During the period between Sharpeville in 1960

and the eve of the Portuguese collapse in 1974, South Africa

underwent many changes. Internally, non-white opposition

was suppressed by means of draconian security laws, and

new organizations such as BOSS grew up to further combat

internal and external threats. More important, however,

was the growth of the defense establishment in South Africa.

During this time the SADF grew from a militia-type organiza-

tion with little influence in the domestic government to

a force which made South Africa the preeminent regional power,

with important internal and external effects.

        Externally, the implications were clear. As

South Africa's military power grew and the domestic arms

industry provided a larger portion of the SADF's hardware

requirements, the Republic's ability to withstand political

pressures brought to bear by the United States and other

Western nations grew. This marked the beginning of a poten-

tial divergence in the interests and policies of South Africa

on one hand and of the West on the other. While South Africa

would continue to unsuccessfully seek alliances committing

the West to the Republic's defense, once South African

officials had identified the threat as being mainly internal

unrest and externally supported guerrilla war, and decided

that threat could be controlled with domestic resources, the

need for an outside alliance was lessened. As a consequence,

the ability of the West to influence South Africa's internal and external policies was also lessened.

South Africa's growing military might also had implications for the region. South Africa first deployed forces outside its borders in September 1967 against ANC elements involved in operations with the Zimbabwe United People's Union (ZAPU) in Rhodesia along the Zambezi River. In 1968, Minister of Defense P. W. Botha warned Zambia publicly that acting as a base for guerrillas could provoke South African response against military targets (such as those employed by the Israelis against the PLO).[74] This was the first time that South Africa made clear that the defense of its borders recognized no frontiers. By 1969, the number of South African paramilitary police in Rhodesia reached 2700.[75]

In 1970, at the height of the Outward Movement, Prime Minister Vorster offered black states a non-aggression pact, saying South Africa's intentions were purely defensive. The move was indeed defensive, for if countries such as Zambia would agree, then guerrillas would lose their bases and training facilities. However, this offer was reinforced by more sinister definitions of South Africa's "defensive" options. The Republic's actions in Rhodesia and Botha's threats of Israeli-style reprisal raids were an implicit part of South Africa's defensive strategy, as was the statement of Vorster to Parliament in 1970, when he said that if

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guerrillas invaded South Africa from other countries, "...we shall resist them. If they take to flight we shall chase them and we shall do so right into those countries from which they came."[76]

II. TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY

A. 1973 AND AFTER: THE INWARD TURNING

  1. Effects of the Portuguese Coup and South African
      Intervention in Angola

On 25 April 1974, the Armed Forces Movement in Portu-
gal overthrew the government of that country, and installed
in its place the revolutionary government of General Antonio
de Spinola. In May 1974, less than one month after the
coup, Portuguese leaders began conferring with independence
leaders from Guinea-Bissau, Mozambique, and Angola, and on
25 July 1974, General Spinola officially recognized the right
of Portugal's overseas possessions to total independence.

Although the guerrilla wars in the Portuguese colonies
had been in progress for some time, South Africa was not
prepared for the rapid collapse of what had been a vast,
white-controlled northern buffer zone which had separated
the Republic from independent black Africa. Pretoria was
especially concerned by the establishment of self-proclaimed
Marxist states on its borders, providing sanctuary for anti-
South African movements and access to Namibia, where fighting
against the South West Africa People's Organization (SWAPO)
had been in progress since 1966,[77] Rhodesia, and South
Africa itself.

The South African response to the independence of
Angola and Mozambique was different in each case. On the

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one hand, Mozambique was heavily dependent economically on South Africa, therefore when that country gained independence in June 1975, South Africa quickly moved to renew economic ties. Prime Minister Vorster saw a free Mozambique as of little threat and even declined to support a short-lived takeover attempt by unhappy whites.[78]

Angola, on the other hand, was a different situation for Vorster. South Africa had little economic leverage there, and growing strife among the three nationalist groups seemed to indicate the risk of spill-over of violence into South West Africa. There was also the concern that a radical government in Luanda would actively support SWAPO. As fighting intensified in Angola among the former guerrilla groups, South Africa resisted the impulse to intervene directly until October 1975.[79] Then, between October and December 1975, the SADF undertook three ground operations in Angola. The objectives of these operations, which were conducted without significant mechanized or air support[80] were unclear, but the result was a catastrophe for South Africa for several reasons:[81] (1) the intervention may have resulted in bringing a large Communist (Cuban) presence onto the border of Southwest Africa in response to South African involvement (although it seems likely the Cuban build-up was at least planned prior to South African involvement);[82] (2) potential Angolan leaders such as Savimbi were discredited through association with South Africa while

the most radical elements of the MPLA, the group which came to power, were strengthened; (3) hostility by Angola towards South Africa was assured, so there was little hope of a Mozambique-like rapprochement with Angola; and (4) lack of international support for the South African intervention made it clear to South Africa that it could not count on the West to come to its aid even in time of crisis.

2. Rhodesia

From the time of the Portuguese collapse in 1974, Prime Minister Vorster was faced with the prospect of rising violence and increased South African involvement in Rhodesia. From Pretoria's standpoint, the least desirable occurrence in Rhodesia would have been a Communist inspired, black-led take over. Internationalization of the war in Rhodesia would have presented South Africa with the possible need for in-crased intervention, and left the Republic open to a possible upswing in black urban violence and worsening relations with Angola and Mozambique.[83] It is not surprising, therefore, that South Africa supported a negotiated settlement leading to a moderate black government in Rhodesia as opposed to further racial strife. In spite of the fact that Vorster had a domestic political tightrope to walk over the question of support for Rhodesia, it was clear by 1975 that South Africa was supporting a negotiated settlement and pressuring the regime of Ian Smith to go to the bargaining table.

Once the Geneva Conference on Rhodesia had broken
down in 1977, South Africa backed Smith's attempts at inter-
nal settlement. The government of P. W. Botha, which suc-
ceeded Vorster's, provided financial, military and logistic
aid to the Muzorewa regime which came to power as a result
of the Rhodesian internal settlement. During this period,
two SADF battalions operated in southern Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.[84]
However, a lack of international support and growing diplo-
matic pressures brought all parties back to the conference
table in 1979, and in March 1980, as a result of British
observed elections, Robert Mugabe, leader of the Zimbabwe
African National Union (ZANU) was elected to head a new
government.

If the Portuguese withdrawal was South Africa's major
shock of the mid-1970s, Mugabe's victory was the disappoint-
ment of 1980. South Africa had supported Muzorewa in the
election, but would have preferred even the election of
guerrilla leader Joshua Nkomo to the Mugabe victory. Appre-
hension over Mugabe's assumption of power in Zimbabwe led
P. W. Botha to issue a familiar warning to the new government
in that country: "Any neighbor which allows its territory
to be used for attacks on or the undermining of South
Africa and its security will have to face the full force of
the Republic's strength."[85]

3. <u>Confluence of Pressures: Other Events 1974 and After</u>

Although the Portuguese withdrawal and the failure
of the Angolan intervention was a major turning point for

South Africa's foreign relations, other events which occurred after 1974 internationally and regionally heightened South Africa's feeling of isolation.

   a.   Arab Oil Embargo

        While the oil embargo called for by the OAU was initiated by oil producing states late in 1973, it had no real effect on South Africa until 1978, due to the non-observance of the embargo by Iran. Iran and South Africa had maintained friendly relations since World War II, when Iran's exiled Reza Shah Pahlavi resided in South Africa. After the 1973 embargo was imposed, Iran continued to meet 90% of South Africa's oil requirements until 1978, when Iranian internal difficulties halted these supplies.[86]

        The effects of the embargo were also ameliorated by the fact that South Africa depended upon oil for less than 25% of its energy needs. The balance was met by hydroelectric power, coal, and gas.[87] After the loss of Iranian supplies, the Republic was still able to satisfy its needs through purchases on the spot market.

        The real effect of the embargo was to reveal to South Africa the vulnerability of its economy to interruption of energy supplies. The oil which was imported was critical to communications, defense, and to the chemical and fertilizer industries.[88] In addition, less obvious but at least as important, the oil embargo had the potential effect of weakening Western opposition to further sanctions

against South Africa, for Western nations were now forced

to take into account both the Afro-Arab alliance against

South Africa and their own vulnerabilities to oil sanctions.[89]

b. South Africa and the United Nations

Pressures on South Africa in the United Nations

dated back to the 1960's. In 1961, the General Assembly

called for states to take "separate and collective action"

against South Africa.[90] In August 1963, a resolution was

passed calling for a voluntary arms embargo against South

Africa, and a coordinated effort by black countries also

resulted in South Africa being forced out of the Food and

Agricultural Organization (FAO) in 1963, and from the

International Labor Organization (ILO) and the World Health

Organization (WHO) in 1964.

United Nations pressure also grew against South

Africa's continued occupation of Southwest Africa. In

1973, the General Assembly recognized SWAPO as the "authen-

tic representative of the Namibian people,"[91] and appointed

a UN Commissioner for Namibia. During 1974, the UN enacted

a decree prohibiting exploitation of the resources of

Namibia without UN approval. Finally, on 17 December 1974,

the Security Council unanimously passed a resolution demand-

ing that South Africa withdraw from the territory.[92]

In 1974, after a number of attempts, the UN was

finally able to reject the credentials of the South African

delegation to the General Assembly, although a further attempt

to remove South Africa from the United Nations altogether, sponsored by the OAU members, was vetoed by France, Great Britain, and the United States. Since 1974, South Africa has maintained its delegation to the UN, but its ambassador has not taken his seat in the General Assembly except when the Namibia question was under debate.

Further important action by the United Nations against South Africa occurred in November 1977, when a resolution banning arms sales to the Republic, previously vetoed in 1975, 1976, and October 1977, was supported by the Western powers.[93] This unprecedented ban by the UN against a member country was not only intended to cut South Africa off from its traditional sources of arms supplies, but also to send Pretoria a message that its domestic policies were unacceptable. The unintended message which was also conveyed was that South Africa was marked for further international isolation, and the Republic became more determined to carry on alone.

c. Internal Unrest[94]

In June 1976, South Africa was struck by racial disturbances which surpassed those which followed Sharpeville in 1960 in violence and intensity. The issue which touched off the trouble was the continued use of Afrikans for instruction in black high schools, but the violence which ensued revealed the extent of suppressed discontent among non-whites. By the time the protests had subsided in November

1976, the disorders had spread to almost every non-white township and university in the country.

The response of the government to these internal disorders was to conduct a massive security campaign, enlarging SAP and other police reserves, further tightening security laws, and conducting a wave of arrests, detentions, and bannings. In spite of the fact that the unrest was eventually suppressed, the so-called Soweto period of turmoil had major implications for South Africa. First, coming on the heels of the abortive Angolan venture, the internal disturbances were a further shock to the white population. Second, the violence of the demonstrations and the repression with which they were met reminded the world of the inequitable nature of apartheid and the sense of black frustration which the system had led to. Finally, and most importantly, the blacks who fled the country during and after the riots became the new guerrilla fighters of the PAC and ANC. These organizations, in turn, became increasingly militant. It was after Soweto that armed guerrilla incidents inside South Africa began to increase. For its part, the SAP explicitly linked Soweto and the rise in urban terrorism, and used these incidents to win public support for new counterinsurgency campaigns.

4. South African Foreign Policy 1974-1978

Realization of the implications of the Portuguese coup brought a new phase to Vorster's Outward Movement. This

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phase came to be known as detente. The essence of this policy was that South Africa should assert leadership in southern Africa and win the cooperation of black African states in providing regional stability and preventing the spread of radicalism.[95] Detente, in practice, proved to be short lived. It effectively ended with South Africa's intervention in Angola and with the collapse of the South African-Zambian initiative in Rhodesia.[96] Further, President Nyerere of Tanzania had already undermined any chance of detente with the Dar es Salaam declaration, signed by sixteen nations in April 1975. While this statement did not reject South African involvement in the settlement of the Rhodesian problem, it did rule out any concessions towards South Africa itself. It further stated that black Africa must be prepared for armed struggle if a peaceful transition to majority rule failed in South Africa.[97]

The remainder of Vorster's administration was spent mainly on the defensive. As 1976 brought a new wave of internal unrest, which in turn led to new government repressions, new waves of black South Africans entered ANC camps in neighboring countries. In 1977, the U.S. Carter administration came to office, and brought with it new tensions to South Africa's relations with the West. The death in September 1977 of Black Consciousness leader Steve Biko while in detention in South Africa, followed by new crackdowns on political organizations, individuals, and newspapers by

Vorster, cost South Africa's foreign relations heavily,
and led directly to the 1977 UN arms embargo against the
Republic.[98]

In September 1978, Vorster was forced to resign
due to a scandal within his government. He was succeeded
by P. W. Botha, his Minister of Defense.

B. P. W. BOTHA: TOTAL ONSLAUGHT/TOTAL STRATEGY[99]

   1.   The Total Onslaught--Background

Upon his assumption of power in 1978, P. W. Botha
found South Africa faced with distinctly hostile internal
and external positions. Internally, the aftermath of the
racial unrest of 1976 was still being felt. In addition,
the white population was still reeling under the impact of
revelations of scandal in the upper ranks of both the govern-
ment and the National Party. Externally, the country's
position had become increasingly less secure with the loss
of the Portuguese buffer and the escalating conflict in
Rhodesia. In addition, the rising level of violence along
the Namibia-Angola border led to increasing pressure from
the United Nations and concurrent loss of South African con-
fidence in the other parties involved in that dispute.
Finally, the Republic's relations with the West had deteri-
orated to new lows due to the impasse over Namibia, the
pressures in the UN, and the failure of Western support
during the Angolan affair.

It is not surprising, considering the pressures felt by South Africa, that the government would believe the country was faced with a "total onslaught" of internal and external attack aimed at the overthrow of the existing order. Botha realized revolution in South Africa was possible, and he was the first to acknowledge this fact publicly.[100] He also realized that revolutions fail when met by an effective counter-revolutionary strategy which eliminates or diffuses those forces threatening the existing order.[101] Botha was determined to mobilize the society to implement such a strategy.

2. Total Onslaught Defined[102]

As can be seen from previous discussion, South Africa has for some time seen itself as the target of external threats. Since 1945, the country has perceived a Communist inspired threat to its security.[103] As the perception of threat grew through the internal unrest of the 1960s and the increasing pressures of the 1970s, the onslaught was still perceived as Communist inspired, but the threat was no longer seen as confined to Communist sources.

General Magnus Malan, Defense Minister and former head of the SADF saw the onslaught as being directed against the whole Western World, of which South Africa is a part. He defined the onslaught as

> ...an ideologically motivated struggle...the aim (of which) is the implacable and unconditional imposition of the aggressor's will on the target state. The aim is also therefore total, not only in terms of the ideology, but also as regards the political, social, economic, and technical areas.[104]

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In the onslaught, South Africa was seen as a key due to its strategic location, mineral wealth, strong economy, and highly developed infrastructure.

The threats against South Africa posed by the total onslaught were seen to be many. The conventional military threat was believed by Prime Minister Botha to be limited, as the SADF's strength would exact too heavy a toll on an enemy. Therefore, the military threat was mainly an indirect one of Communist backing for terrorists and guerrillas. This threat perception was similar to that developed by Botha in the early 1960s and refined in 1971.[105] This did not, however, mean that the threat of conventional war could be discounted. General Malan has stated that while "it is primarily an unconventional war,...the threat of a conventional war in the near future can by no means be excluded."[106]

In addition to the threat of military action against the Republic, the onslaught also envisioned anti-South African actions in the political, diplomatic, religious, psychological, cultural, social, and sports spheres. In General Malan's view, the onslaught is directed at South Africa's four "power bases:" (1) the political/diplomatic; (2) the economic; (3) the social/psychological; and, (4) the security.

While the Communists were still seen as the main force behind the total onslaught, they were not seen as the only one. The OAU, the UN, and other groupings of black states figured in the onslaught. Also considered was the

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threat posed by South Africa's neighbors due to the harboring of terrorists and the build up of Soviet supplied conventional arms in Angola, Mozambique, and Zambia.

As the West pressured South Africa for internal reforms, Western nations also came to be seen as an indirect part of the onslaught. In General Malan's words, in order to protect their interests in black Africa, "it can be... justifiably claimed that the Western Powers make themselves available as handymen of the communists and they are indirectly contributing to the destruction of capitalism and the establishment of world communism."[107]

There are two important points to be taken from this distillation of South Africa's multifaceted threat into the "Total Onslaught." First, the threat appraisal ignores the possibility that South Africa's internal policies could be a cause of the country's internal tensions, instead rationalizing the cause for internal unrest as the external onslaught. This is consistent with South African appraisal of domestic problems since the 1960 Sharpeville disturbances. Secondly, and what is more important for South Africa's policies, is that the concept of "Total Onslaught" can be used to justify the implementation of the "Total National Strategy."

C. TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY

1. Background

The concept of the Total Onslaught assumed more importance and was further defined as P. W. Botha came to

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office, for it was a concept which had grown from the strate-
gic thinking of the defense establishment and the SADF. In
the 1977 Defense White Paper, the Total National Strategy was
defined as "the comprehensive plan to utilize all the means
available to a state according to an integrated pattern in
order to achieve the national aims within the framework of
the specific policies. A Total National Strategy is not,
therefore, confined to a particular sphere, but is applicable
to all levels and to all functions of the state structure."[108]
Just as Botha defined the onslaught, he also devised the
counter-revolutionary strategy to meet it. In May 1979,
Botha, while holding high level meetings to devise his
strategy, said that "a country which is facing a total on-
slaught has to have a total strategy to combat it..." and
"...it was essential that South Africa's strategy should be
a total one in which military, political, and economic
factors could all play a part."[109]

2. The Twelve-Point Plan

Throughout the first half of 1979, Botha and his
main spokesman, General Malan, continued to expand upon the
total conflict and the need for a strategy to combat the
threats it posed.[110] In June, Malan called for cohesion of
population groups to face the communist conventional, uncon-
ventional, and psychological threats.[111] In July, P. W.
Botha raised the "Total Conflict" issue with regard to South
Africa's position in Namibia.[112]

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By August, 1979, Botha was ready to unveil his new
strategy. Speaking at the Natal National Party Congress,
he outlined what has come to be known as the 12-point plan.[113]
This plan as it was stated and fine-tuned over the following
months, was an attempt to define policy objectives for the
government over a wide range of interests. Botha presented
the plan as one to which the government was totally committed,
and as the only hope for salvation in the face of the Total
Onslaught.[114] (See Appendix A for the specific points of the
plan.)

The first six points of the plan dealt with what were
mainly domestic political matters. In short, these six
stated the ideological foundation of the plan, making it
clear that the plan is a restatement of National Party policy,
committing South Africa to separate development. The seventh
point recognizes the economic integration between the races
which had already occurred, and can be seen as a government
move to remove ideology from economic activity.

The eighth point declares what had already become a
major foreign policy initiative of the Botha regime: the
creation of a "peaceful constellation of states in southern
Africa." The formation of this constellation was seen as
inevitable as conditions, especially economic conditions,
but also political and security considerations, drew the
states of the region into closer relationships. In short,
the constellation was a South African attempt to detach

pressures concerning its internal policies from its external

relations, and to draw its neighbors closer through mainly

economic means.[115]

The ninth, tenth, and eleventh points deal with South

Africa's defense policies. The ninth states South Africa's

determination to defend itself from all outside interference

in all ways. The tenth calls for a policy of neutrality in

the East-West conflict. The eleventh concerns the "maintenance

of effective decision making by the state, which rests on a

strong Defense Force and Police Force to guarantee orderly

government as well as efficient, clear administration."[116]

This point reflects Botha's style of governing and his up-

coming reorganization, and the increasing role of the military

in South Africa's government.

Point twelve commits the South African government to

the maintenance of free enterprise as the economic basis of

the country. This point reflects Botha's attempt to draw

the economic sector into his plans for both the constellation

and internal change, and thus relates to points seven and

eight.

3. The Mechanics of the Total National Strategy

As can be seen from the diverse areas covered in the

12-point plan, it is obvious that the Total National Strategy

would have far reaching consequences. Plans and policies

devised under the heading of Total National Strategy (TNS)

affected all of South Africa through the reorganization of

the government, through more repressive controls on the
population, and through the increasing importance of the
security establishment and the military.

　　　a.　Government Reorganization

　　　In 1978, disclosure of the now famous information
scandal showed that government under Vorster was at worst cor-
rupt and at best administratively sloppy, and led to Vorsters'
downfall.[117]　His successor, P. W. Botha, announced adminis-
trative reforms in government beginning in 1979, but it took
several years for his initiatives to be fully implemented.
This reorganization would serve to tighten up the slack prac-
tices of Vorster's government, however, they were not con-
ducted solely to correct past mistakes.　There were other
perceived shortcomings to be corrected.[118]　First, South
Africa's involvement in the Angolan civil war in 1975 had
revealed the need for a more formalized method of government
decision making.[119]　In order to correct these shortcomings
and to provide a better decision making process, the security
management system was established.

　　　Second, Botha's concern for the internal and ex-
ternal security of South Africa led to the development of the
Total National Strategy in order to make better use of South
Africa's resources in meeting the Total Onslaught.　Third,
Botha's definition of a Total National Strategy gave government
a sense of direction which had previously been lacking.
Finally, the scandal which had brought down Vorster's

government left the country with the feeling that change in government was needed. Botha was able to capitalize on this feeling to institute his programs.

In Phase I of Botha's government reorganization, known as the rationalization program, the number of cabinet committees was reduced from 22 to five, including National Security (the SSC), Economic Affairs, Social Affairs, Internal Affairs, and Finance. This number was later reduced by one when the Committee for Finance was merged with the Committee for Economic Affairs. In addition, the Committee for Internal Affairs was renamed the Committee for Constitutional Affairs. Table 3 reflects the South African government organization as it is today.

While all four cabinet committees are theoretically equal, several factors combine to set the State Security Council (SSC) off as the dominant committee. The SSC will be discussed in greater detail below.

b. The Rise of the Security Establishment

(1) Background. Botha's government reorganization in the name of the Total National Strategy has had the effect of centralizing power in the Cabinet, and, even further, into a few departments informally called the inner Cabinet at the expense of Parliament and the National Party. As power has become centralized in the executive under Botha, and previously important institutions such as BOSS (now the National Intelligence Service--NIS) and the Information

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TABLE 3[120]

SOUTH AFRICAN GOVERNMENT ORGANIZATION
EXECUTIVE BRANCH

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┌──────────── PRIME MINISTER ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┐
│                        │
- SECRETARY OF THE CABINET ── CABINET
- CABINET SECRETARIAT            │
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CABINET COMMITTEE FOR ECONOMIC AFFAIRS--Ministers Deputy Ministers Department Heads	CABINET COMMITTEE FOR SOCIAL AFFAIRS—Ministers Deputy Ministers Department Heads	CABINET COMMITTEE FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AFFAIRS--Ministers Deputy Ministers Department Heads	STATE SECURITY COUNCIL Established and Constituted in terms of Act 64 of 1972
Working Group Department Heads	Working Group Department Heads	Working Group Department Heads	Working Group Department Heads
Interdepartmental Task Groups; cooperation at the regional level	Interdepartmental Task Groups; cooperation at the regional level	Interdepartmental Task Groups; cooperation at the regional level	Interdepartmental Task Groups; cooperation at the regional level

Department were downgraded, reorganized, or dismantled. The
security establishment gained influence at the expense of
other bodies.

    (2)   The Security Establishment.

    (a)   The South African Defense Force/
Department of Defense. P. W. Botha came to power from the
defense establishment, where he had served for 14 years as
Minister of Defense and had presided over the enlargement of
the SADF and buildup of the defense industry. During his
tenure as Minister of Defense, he came to admire the managerial

style of the military, and upon becoming Prime Minister,
he brought with him high ranking SADF personnel as advisors.

The Permanent Force officers in government became involved in the construction and execution of
overall defense strategy, especially with regard to Namibia.
In addition, these officers also became involved with other
governmental, political, and economic elites in agencies
such as the SSC.

As previously discussed, the buildup
of the SADF and the arms industry in South Africa began in
response to the threats of the early 1960s. The events of
the mid-1970s acted as the catalyst for even larger increases
in both the size of the SADF and in defense spending. After
1974, defense spending continued to increase at a rapid
pace (see Table 4).

What was even more significant about
the rise in defense spending was the fact that it took place
during a period of general economic slowdown. By 1983/84,
spending on defense had tripled over the 1975/76 budget.

During this period, the SADF also increased in size and changed in composition. As Table 5 shows,
the size of the Defense Force almost doubled btween 1974/75
and 1983/84. As this growth began to strain available white
manpower assets, first women and then non-whites were
accepted in increasing numbers. Within the expansion of
the SADF was included an attempt to increase the size of the

TABLE 4[122]

SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE SPENDING
1974/75 to 1983/84

FINANCIAL YEAR	DEFENSE BUDGET (MILLION CURRENT RAND)	PERCENT OF BUDGET	PERCENT OF GNP	PERCENT INCREASE OVER PREVIOUS YEAR
1974/75	692	16.0	3.2	47
1975/76	948	18.5	3.7	37
1976/77	1,400	17.0	4.1	48
1977/78	1,526*	19.0	5.1	9
1978/79	1,682	NA	NA	10.3
1979/80	1,857	NA	NA	10.4
1980/81	2,865	NA	NA	54.3
1981/82	2,465	NA	NA	-13
1982/83	2,700	NA	NA	8
1983/84	3,090	NA	NA	15.9

*Revised downward due to the cancellation of R128 million shipbuilding contract by France.

TABLE 5[123]

GROWTH OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE FORCE
(numbers in '000)

	74/75	75/76	76/77	77/78	78/79	79/80	80/81	81/82	82/83	83/484
TOTAL ARMED FORCES	47.45	50.5	51.5	55.0	65.5	63.25	86.05	92.7	81.4	82.4
-Conscripts	31.75	35.4	35.4	38.4	48.9	45.25	66.25	66.1	53.1	53.1
ARMY	34.5	38.0	38.0	41.0	50.0	48.5	71.0	76.0	67.4	67.4
-White Regulars	7	7	7	7	NA	6	6	10	10	10
-Coloured/ Black Regulars	0	0	0	0	NA	2.5	3	4	5.4	5.4
-Women	0	0	.18	2.1	2.1	NA	2	2	2	2
-Conscripts	27.5	31	31	34	43	40	60	60	50	50
REQUIRED ACTIVE SERVICE	9-12 mo.	1 yr	1 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr	2 yr

Permanent Force, as the numbers of regulars in the army
increased from 7000 whites in 1974/75 to 15,400 of all races
in 1983/84. Conscription policies also changed during this
period to fuel the SADF's rising manpower demands.

(b) The Intelligence Community. The
*influence of this community has been marked by continual
flux.* It is made up of the Department of Military Intelli-
gence (DMI), the National Intelligence Service (NIS), and
the Security Police.

The South African intelligence apparatus
had long been the arena for intense inter-service rivalry.
When BOSS was established in the 1960's, its head, General
van den Bergh, had Prime Minister Vorster's confidence,
and was appointed Security Advisor to the Prime Minister in
1968. When this happened, DMI suspected that *BOSS intended
to assume some of the duties assigned to military intelli-
gence.* This led to an intense rivalry between BOSS and DMI,
and clashes between van den Bergh and Minister of Defense
Botha. However, van den Bergh fell from power with Vorster,
and Botha chose to consolidate central intelligence functions
under DMI.

To date there is still rivalry between
all three security services. BOSS has evolved through a
name change to Department of National Security (DONS) to
become NIS , and now functions mostly as an intelligence think
tank rather than as a gatherer of intelligence. DMI seems

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to have assumed the function of external intelligence
gathering, with policy advice coming from SADF personnel.
The position of the Security Police was also enhanced with
the demise of BOSS/DONS/NIS, and the former head of the
Security Police is now Commissioner of Police.

(c) The Intellectual Community. This
group consists of the segments of South African society
which serve the defense establishment on an ad hoc basis.
There are centers of strategic studies at Rand Afrikaans
University, the University of Pretoria, and the University
of South Africa. There are also independent bodies such
as the Terrorism Research Center in Capetown, and individual
academics on call to the government.

(d) Arms and Associated Industries. The
leading defense related industries are the large parastatal
corporations, such as the Armament Corporation of South
Africa (ARMSCOR) and the State Petroleum firm (SASOL).
ARMSCOR is South Africa's largest industrial venture with
1.2 billion Rand in assets. As a result of ARMSCOR's
actions, South Africa is now the tenth largest producer of
armaments in the world. ARMSCOR directly employs 29,000
workers and provides employment for nearly 100,000 through
its subsidiaries and private subcontractors. Its subsidiaries
and their products include:[124]

1. Atlas Aircraft Corporation--aircraft manufacture,
    maintenance, and service.

2. INFOPLAN--computer services.

3. Kentron--guide weapons and optical equipment.

4. Lyttleton Engineering Works--small arms and guns.

5. Musgrave Manufactures and Distributors--commercial small arms and shotguns.

6. Naschem, Lenz, and Potchefstran--heavy ammunition and bombs.

7. Pretoria Metal Pressing--small calibre ammunition.

8. Swartklip Products--pyrotechnics, detonators, mines, hand grenades and commercial ammunition.

Through these subsidiaries and their subcontractors ARMSCOR has ties with every area of the country and with every industry. In addition, since his tenure as Minister of Defense, P. W. Botha utilized leading industrialists as advisors and to head ARMSCOR and its subsidiaries. He has continued this practice as Prime Minister. For example, in 1980, the ARMSCOR Board of Directors included as members the Executive Director of Barlow Rand, South Africa's largest corporation, the South African Resident Representative to the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and the Chief General Manager of the Industrial Development Corporation of South Africa, just to note a few.[125]

ARMSCOR also reaches into the country's educational system by providing scholarships and apprentice training to students and workers in various fields.[126]

Other parastatals, such as ISCOR
and SASOL have defense and security links through planning
bodies, sales to security forces and other state depart-
ments. Finally, the Total National Strategy ties the
businss community in general to the government by the inclu-
sion of economic factors in the 12-point plan. The Defense
Advisory Board, whose members are business elites, provides
further links between business, defense, and the government.

(e) The South African Police (SAP).[127]
The South African Police developed from the variety of
security forces established over the years in response to
different conditions and perceived threats. After the Act
of Union in 1910, the police forces of the provinces of South
Africa were consolidated into two law enforcement agencies.
These were the South African Mounted Riflemen, detailed to
rural areas, and the SAP, responsible for urban areas. The
SAP subsequently absorbed the Mounted Riflemen and, in 1936,
were given jurisdiction throughout the country. In 1939,
SAP responsibilities were extended to include Southwest
Africa, and later amendments to the Police Act permitted
the SAP to be employed outside the country when requested
by friendly governments, and when these operations were
deemed to be in the best interest of South Africa's internal
security. In the 1960's and 1970's SAP units were involved
in counterinsurgency operations in Rhodesia and Portuguese
Mozambique.

As it exists today, the SAP is a
paramilitary organization, the primary function of which is
the maintenance of internal security. SAP operates under
the authority of the Minister of Police and is administered
by the Commissioner of Police, who holds the rank of general.
In 1983, the South African budget allowed 546 million
Rand for the SAP, and increase of 17.1% over the previous
year's expenditures.[128]

In 1983, the SAP had a strength
of 35,500, of which 19,500 were white and 16,000 were non-
white.[129] In addition, the Police Reserve consisted of about
20,000 men who had received paramilitary training, and an
amendment to the Defense Act allowed military reservists
and Commandos to be mobilized on short notice to assist the
SAP in emergencies.

Organizationally, the SAP is
divided into three branches. (1) The Uniformed Branch
is mainly concerned with routine police work and crime
prevention, as well as with clerical duties, overall SAP
administration, and supply and maintenance of police equip-
ment and transport. (2) The Detective Branch operates
from SAP headquarters and is subdivided into the Criminal
Investigation Division, which is reponsible for the assign-
ment of plainclothesmen, and the Special Branch, which is
responsible for police intelligence gathering, surveillance,
and investigation of subversive activities. (3) Finally,
the Security Branch is responsible for border patrol and

internal security activities in South Africa and Namibia which are not otherwise assigned to the SADF. All Security branch units are self-sufficient in weapons, transport, communications, and logistic support. These units have operated in Namibia with the SADF.

The SAP conducts its own training and recruiting. Personnel are enlisted on a voluntary basis from throughout South Africa. Most white police are Afrikaners, while most blacks are from rural areas. Since the passage of the Group Areas Act in 1950, non-white police personnel have been made responsible for duties in non-white areas. Black police were normally brought in from different parts of South Africa to avoid any sympathy for the local population. Whites enlisting in the SAP are exempted from National Service with the SADF. A women's contingent was established in 1972.

(f)   The State Security Council.[130] Many of the organizations discussed above are brought together by the State Security Council (SSC). While technically the SSC is only one of four cabinet committees which are formally equal, there is little doubt that the SSC is the principal of these committees.

Several features set the SSC off from the other cabinet committees.[131] (1) The SSC is the only cabinet committee established by law, and which consists of a membership established by law. (2) The

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SSC is the only cabinet committee chaired by the Prime Minister. (3) The SSC concerns itself with a greater range of issues than any of the other committees. (4) The SSC's network of supporting bodies is more comprehensive than those of other committees. (5) The SSC's meetings are closed to the participation of non-members, who may only attend if specifically invited or co-opted. (6) The SSC is exempt from the rule that decisions of cabinet committees must be circulated with cabinet minutes. SSC decisions are not subject to confirmation by the full cabinet.

Even if the membership and scope of the SSC did not give it a preeminent status, it would still assume enhanced importance due to its size, organization, and resources. The secretary of the SSC, Lieutenant General Andries Jacobus van Deventer, has a secretariat which is much larger than those employed by the other cabinet committees. The Secretariat of the SSC (SSSC) consists of three branches: National Intelligence Interpretation, Total Strategy, and another, the name of which is classified. While technically the SSC reports administratively to the NIS, it is directly responsible to the Prime Minister.

In addition, General van Deventer possesses a large amount of bureaucratic influence. Besides serving as Secretariat of the SSC, he also sits as a member of the working groups of the other three cabinet committees (see Table 3), and is also involved in the distribution and

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channeling of all policy papers destined for cabinet con-
siderations due to the fact that he also holds the position
of cabinet secretariat jointly with John H. Huyser, a retired
intelligence officer.

Also subordinate to the SSC working
committee are some 15 interdepartmental committees (IDC's)
which are the originators of nearly all policy recommenda-
tions. The IDC's cover a wide range, including the Political
Action Committee, the Coordinating Economic Committee, the
Manpower Committee, and the Transport Coordinating Committee,
to name just a few. IDC membership consists mainly of heads
of departments, senior deputies, legal advisors, and an
SADF representative on each committee who reports directly
to van Deventer.

Finally, the SSC network includes a
series of Joint Management Centers (known as GBS for the
Afrikaans GESAMENTLIKE BESTUURSSENTRUMS). There are nine
GBS which serve geographical areas of South Africa and which
coincide with the area commands of the SADF, and there is
a tenth for Walvis Bay. There are also four GBS's for
certain southern African countries, including Namibia. All
are based within South Africa and all are designed to carry
the Total National Strategy throughout the country in an
organized manner.

It is apparent that the SSC has become
the preeminent governing body within the South African

government. All questions with security implications are brought to it, and through the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy concept almost every aspect of government can be interpreted as having security implications. In addition, through its influence over the cabinet secretariat and its membership, the SSC can influence many of the decisions of the other cabinet committees. Not only is the SSC the principal cabinet committee, it also serves as an inner cabinet of the Prime Minister and his highest ranking experts. When the SSC recommends policy, the full cabinet is not likely to deny that policy.

c. Constitutional Change

(1) Background. Recently, talk of reorganizing the government by constitutional change has been much dis-cussed by the elite of the National Party. As the expression of Western European political liberalism, the Westminister system made it difficult to maintain government secrecy, and was not in consonance with the harsher security measures taken after 1960. The National Party had been considering a constitutional alternative more in keeping with the visions of a plural society.[132]

In 1976, the Theron Commission, which had been investigating Coloured matters since 1973, suggested that the Westminister system of government be reconsidered.[133] This report led to the appointment of a cabinet committee chaired by P. W. Botha, then Minister of Defense, to consider

whether a new political formula could be found. Botha's proposals in 1977 included power sharing between white, coloured, and Asian peoples, and were later approved by provincial congresses of the National Party and submitted to Parliament as a draft bill in 1979. This draft bill was in turn submitted to the Schlebusch Commission.

The 1980 report of the Schlenbusch Commission led to the appointment of a President's Council to draft a new constitution. This President's Council included white, coloured, and Asian representatives, but excluded blacks. The President's Council submitted its recommendations in May 1982.

(2) The Constitution. P. W. Botha slightly modified the recommendations of the President's Council in forming his constitutional plan. This plan envisioned a new structure of government in South Africa, laid out as follows:[134]

1. A President as executive head of state, combining the former offices of State President and Prime Minister, to be elected by an electoral college.

2. An electoral college of 50 white, 25 coloured, and 13 Asian members appointed by their respective chambers in Parliament.

3. A tricameral Parliament for the three population groups, white, coloured, and Asian, each to determine policy on matters affecting its own group.

4. A cabinet appointed by the President, to include members of all three racial groups.

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5. A President's Council of 20 whites, 10 coloured, and
   5 Asians, elected by their representative chambers,
   and 25 members appointed by the President, to act as
   final arbiter in disputes.

The new constitution was approved on 2 November 1983 by a 66% majority of white voters. No referendum was held for coloured or Asian voters, and blacks were excluded from participation.

(3) The New Constitution and the Total National Strategy. Viewed in the context of Botha's Total National Strategy, the new constitution has several potential goals. First, including population groups other than whites has the effect of co-opting those groups and weakening their support for potential opposition movements. It also has the potential to garner international support due to indications of reform. Second, and perhaps most importantly, the system embodied in the new Constitution was very adaptable to the strong leader, thus completing the movement towards the consolidation of power in the executive begun by Botha in his reorganization of the cabinet. It seems apparent that the SSC would assume even greater importance in acting as the de facto secretariat of the President, while other cabinet committees and even the Parliament became less important. Finally, as an additional strength, inclusion of Asians and coloureds in the government would probably make members of those groups liable for the same compulsory military service to which whites are subjected.

d.   Government, Business, and Defense

The Total National Strategy was intended to be concerned with more than the reorganization of government in order to better meet the onslaught against South Africa. In an analysis of the Total National Strategy as a counter-revolutionary strategy, Philip Frankel of the University of Witwatersrand recognized the role of the private sector in the TNS, saying the TNS is "sociologically deeper than government reorganization...and actually involves reforming the elite coalition."[135] This reformation includes an alliance between business, government, and the military on one hand, and the inclusion of racial groups other than whites in government on the other. This was discussed in point seven of the 12-point plan, which recognized the role and importance of non-whites in the economy and condoned official moves towards the de-idealization of the economic sector.[136]

Business was seen to act as a source of mana-gerial skills and capital in support of the Total National Strategy. The Botha style of government as reflected in his reorganizations since becoming Prime Minister resembled the style of a corporate president,[137] and he included important business leaders in the governmental decision making processes (see the discussion of ARMSCOR, above). In addition, Botha also saw private capital as a source of funds for rural and urban development. In rural areas,

capital was to be employed through actions of large corpora-

tions or through government sponsored institutions designed

to stimulate regional trade cooperation. In urban areas,

the government looked to organizations such as the Urban

Foundation to absorb some of the costs of apartheid.[138]

The response of business to this proposed role

in the Total National Strategy was generally favorable. In

the past, the enforcement of apartheid rules led to govern-

ment intervention in the economic sector, curbing private

ventures and constraining productivity. The 12-Point

Plan's emphasis on the free market and its moves towards the

deregulation of the economy was encouraging to South African

businessmen. In addition, the eighth point of the 12-Point

Plan called for a "Constellation of States in southern

Africa, which included the promise of work towards closer

economic ties between the Republic and neighboring states,

and it was expected South African businessmen would assume

the lead in cementing these relationships."[139]

Finally, there was also the desire of the govern-

ment to link the private sector and the Defense Force,

especially in the field of arms development and production.

As previously discussed, a Defense Advisory Board composed

of South African business elites was established to further

involve the private sector in defense activities. The fact

that ARMSCOR made maximum use of the private sector further

indicates the growing links between business and defense.

The defense establishment looked to private industry for the manufacture of 70% of all of the country's domestic arms production, while defense in turn provides leadership, research and development, and access to a small but growing export market.[140]

e. Other Racial Groups

The 12-Point Plan in the area of relations between the races adheres to the tenets of separate development, but with a difference. Points one through three reconfirm the commitment of South Africa to apartheid. Point four assigns some political power in the newly reorganized government to coloured and Asian peoples.[141] In addition, administrative exemptions in the Group Areas Act now allow Asians and coloureds the right to house black servants, and Asians and coloureds to receive general preference over blacks in the expenditure of government money. In these and other matters, it is apparently the intention of the government to blur the racial boundary between coloureds, Asians, and whites while widening the inequalities between these groups and blacks. This can be seen as an attempt to pull two ambiguously situated groups into the white camp, thereby denying their support to the black majority.

Under the Total National Strategy concept, blacks are dealt with in a two-fold strategy. First, rural blacks are handled by the homeland policy, the goal of which is to create a system of semi-independent, semi-autonomous states

dominated by South Africa. Political development in these states is carefully monitored to ensure that these states remain dependent on and under the control of South Africa.[143]

Second, urban blacks receive a new deal which allows them some local political power, limited rights of citizenship and property holding, and the promise of participation in the constellation of states. Moves to accommodate urban blacks have resulted in new reform measures and greater responsiveness to the needs of this group. However, when considered in the light of the Total National Strategy, it seems that these moves are intended to further split opposition to white dominance by separating rural and urban blacks. Just as the "political dispensation" accorded to Asians and coloureds is intended to split these groups from blacks, giving urban blacks a stake in the system is intended to separate them from rural blacks. As Frankel states, "...Total Strategy is also devoted to realizing the old liberal belief that the existence of a 'stable' black middle class committed to the ideals of free enterprise capitalism is an important ingredient in the maintenance of the system."[144]

D. EFFECTS OF THE TOTAL NATIONAL STRATEGY

The Total National Strategy, as discussed above, has had major impacts on the internal organization and operation of the South African government, on South African society, and on the Republic's relations with other countries.

1. Internal Effects

   a. Government

   As noted above, the impact of the Total National
Strategy on the government has been profound. Internally,
Botha's reorganization of the cabinet and his elevation of
the importance of the SSC has tended to short-circuit the
influence of the full cabinet and increase the power of
the Prime Minister over the policy making and implementation
apparatus. In addition, his streamlining of the cabinet has
provided for a more administratively sound system. As a
result of this accretion of influence to the SSC, the real
control of power has slipped away from the elected members
of Parliament and other departments of government.

   The new constitution, approved in November 1983
and now in the process of being implemented, also had a
major impact on how the Republic is governed. For one
thing, for the first time non-whites will be included as
elected representatives in the South African government,
although how much real power and influence the coloured and
Asian chambers will possess is still questionable. Further,
and more importantly, the new constitution supports the
centralization of power begun by the reorganization of the
government. The new system provides for a strong executive
president. It is further assumed that in serving as the
secretariat to the presidential system, the SSC will gain
even more in importance at the expense of the other cabinet
committees and the Parliament.[145]

b. The Militarization of Society

There is no doubt that the influence and impact
of the SADF in South African government has been rising as
the Defense Force becomes more important to the defense of
white South Africa. This increasing influence and its
actual extent has been much discussed, and it is important
to note where it has affected South African society itself.

(1) Impact on Government. The Total National
Strategy is mainly a creation of P. W. Botha, developed and
fine-tuned during his days as Minister of Defense, and
implemented through the military as a solution to the "total
war" being conducted in Namibia.[146] As Minister of Defense,
Botha was influenced by military management efficiency and
planning, and when he became Prime Minister, it was natural
that he bring with him to government the administrators
whose skills he admired, and whom he had promoted in the
SADF. For example, General Magnus Malan was appointed by
Botha as the youngest ever Chief of Staff of the Army,
Chief of the Army, Chief of the SADF, and finally Minister
of Defense.[147] Malan has often served as Botha's communi-
cator, stumping the country to keep the Total Onslaught/
Total National Strategy before the population.

The military influence has also increased
with the rise of the SSC. All military and security matters
are concerns of the SSC, and the SADF is involved in all
decisions on these matters through the SSC. Further, the

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secretary of the SSC, Lieutenant General van Deventer, is a
military man, and the staff of the secretariat draws heavily
on the SADF for 70% of its personnel.[148]   In addition, van
Deventer also serves as the secretary to the cabinet and
as such has much influence over what issues are dealt with
by which cabinet committees. Finally, SADF representatives
sit on all fifteen interdepartmental committees of the SSC.
No other ministry can claim inclusion on more than four of
these committees.[149]

     (2) _Economic Issues_. The relation between
defense, government, and industry has already been discussed,
and the fact that the Total National Strategy requires a
healthy economy and infusions of private money to succeed
domestically already recognized. However, there are other
security issues which have an economic impact.

     First, great effort and resources have been
expended to make South Africa self-sufficient in areas which
are deemed of strategic importance. This includes the South
African nuclear program, the oil-from-coal program and the
efforts of the defense industry. These programs have often
had negative economic impacts, as economy and sophistication
are sacrificed for local content in the name of self-reliance
and national security.

     Secondly, and even more important to the
discussion of the militarization of society, is the cooptation
of many industries through government security planning,

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including legislation such as the National Key Points Act of 1980, the Atomic Energy Act, the National Supplies Procurement Act, and the Petroleum Products Amendment Act.[150] These acts involve private industry, including subsidiaries of foreign transnational firms, in secrecy about their operations. They also provide for the militarization of employees through the establishment of "industrial commandos" for their protection.[151]

(3) Social Issues. The permeation of military influence through ARMSCOR and the armament industry, and through the involvement of industry in security matters has already been noted. However, there are other, more profound ways in which the military influences South African society.

First, as more demands for manpower are made upon white society by the SADF, more men and women are exposed to military training of some kind. In addition, the demands of the Defense Force on society are growing, as the amount of time spent in uniform by the average white male increases. In 1973, this average white male could expect to spend 9 to 12 months on active duty and then another 78 days on three call-ups during a nine-year reserve commitment. In 1983, the average time spent in uniform for the same person had increased to two years on active duty, followed by a reserve commitment of alternate 30 and 90 day callups for twelve years, for a total of 720 days in service (see Table 6).

TABLE 6

SADF Service Requirements

	1973	1974	1978	1983
Initial National Service Requirements (Months)	9-12*	12	24	24
Active Reserve Duty Period (Years)	9*	5	8	12
Number of Callups	3*	5	8	12**
Standard Callup Period (Days)	26*	19	30	60
Total Active Reserve Duty (Days)	78	95	240	720
Controlled Reserve Duty Period (Years)	0	4	0	0

*Figures are for those National Servicemen who joined the Citizen's Force. Those who joined the Commandos were obligated to spend 30-90 days on active duty for the first year and then 19 days a year for the next 15 years for a total of 285 days.

**Upon completion of 12 years in reserve, National Servicemen are then transferred to the Commandos where they are eligible to be called up for 12 days a year to age 55.

Second, the need for manpower has led to the utilization of men of other races and of white women in the Defense Force on a voluntary basis. Further, it can be expected that now that coloureds and Asians have been included in the government and given a limited franchise, pressure to include them in mandatory conscription schemes will increase. Both Asians and coloureds have maintained they will not serve in the SADF on other than a voluntary basis until blacks are included in the government.[152]

Finally, military influence even reaches into the country's educational system. In 1977, the number of "school cadets" receiving military training at school was doubled to 300,000, and a year later the decision was made to conduct cadet training on school holidays and to make attendance obligatory at cadet "adventure camps."[153] In October 1982, it was announced that the Defense Force would establish military units at colleges of education and technicons.[154]

As the above discussion illustrates, the military influence and military service follows the white male South African from his early school years right up to retirement, and his obligation to the military system has grown significantly in the past ten years.

c. The Nature of Society

Frankel has argued that the Total National Strategy is bringing about fundamental changes in the make-up of South African society.[155] Including some areas already discussed, these changes are:

1. Reforming the elite coalition through the inclusion of coloureds and Asians and through the strengthening of the government-military-business alliance.

2. A "new deal" for urban blacks in an attempt to create a black middle class interested in maintaining the system as it exists.

3. The rise in non-partisan civilian and military specialists to positions of political decision

making, weakening the traditional power of the
National Party.

2. Regional Effects

The main regional thrust of the Total National
Strategy was centered in points eight and nine of the
twelve-point plan. Point eight calls for a constellation
of southern African states "with respect for each other's
cultures, traditions, and ideals...," while point nine
addresses "South Africa's firm determination to defend
itself against interference in every possible way."[156]

The constellation concept predated the Twelve Point
Plan by some time. P. W. Botha made it a major foreign
policy initiative upon succeeding Vorster in 1978. The
basis of the concept and objectives of the constellation
as it was developed were based on a set of critical assump-
tions:[157]

1. A constellation would offer the opportunity to find
   regional solutions to regional problems.

2. The "moderate" countries of southern Africa all face
   a common Marxist threat and cannot rely on the West
   for support.

3. The Marxist threat would lead to military cooperation.

4. Mutual interest in trade, agriculture, health, trans-
   portation, and so forth would act to bring southern
   African nations together. This cooperation in turn
   would yield positive political results for South Africa.

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5. The constellation would include South Africa's neighbors and the newly independent homelands.

6. The constellation would be based on the political realities of South African society. In other words, international cooperation among states would not involve South Africa's internal commitment to apartheid.

Through the constellation initiative, Botha hoped to rely on economic forces and mutual security needs to pull southern Africa together. This cooperation would, in turn, lead to positive political gains in the international arena for South Africa. This was a strategy which can be traced back to the time of Verwoerd, when South Africa canvassed Africa for technical cooperation and a live and let live attitude from others,[158] and has so far met with just as little success in its current form. No black state is likely to associate with the non-recognized homelands, or compromise itself with regards to the OAU's stand against separate development. When nine countries of southern Africa formed the Southern African Development Coordination Council (SADCC) to promote independence, it appeared that the constellation concept had failed. As Dr. Geldenhuys recently stated, the Republic "has not succeeded in creating exactly the kind of regional environment it desired."[159]

In light of the failure to gain regional support for the southern African constellation in a form resembling the original concept, the other regional impact of the Total

National Strategy to be considered is the military impact. The military aspect of the Total National Strategy has had the greatest effect on South Africa's neighbors. South Africa's proclivity to intervene in the affairs of other countries in the interest of its own national security pre-dates the Total National Strategy. Yet the growing strength of the SADF, the growing influence of the military in South African government decision making, the centralization of power under Botha, and the failure of the constellation initiative are all events which have coincided with a growing use of South African military might in support of political objectives. As Dr. Geldenhuys states, "the grandiose scheme for a regional constellation of states has given way to an overriding concern with security."[160]

3. <u>International Effects of the Total National Strategy</u>

In defining the Total National Strategy, P. W. Botha pointed out that there are five strategic options open to South African interests:[161]

1. Alignment with the West, which has been the option traditionally selected by South Africa.

2. Qualified neutrality.

3. Alignment with the East.

4. Alliance with middle-ranked powers with similar political philosophies (the so-called "pariah" option).

5. Concentration on regional relations.

From the thrust of the Twelve-Point Plan, it seems that South Africa considers these five options as not

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mutually exclusive. In his analysis of the Total National

Strategy, Geldenhuys points out that in fact only the

first option has been totally rejected, although it seems

unlikely that little of value could come of the third.

Point ten of the Twelve-Point Plan calls for, "a

policy of neutrality in the conflict between the superpowers,

with priority given to South African interests."[162] Yet,

South African movement away from the West predates the Total

National Strategy. Suggestions that the Republic assume

a more neutral stance between East and West were very much a

product of the mid-1970's. South African disenchantment

with the West grew as Western criticism of South Africa's

domestic policies increased. In 1977, this pressure cul-

minated in the UN mandatory arms embargo. Prior to the arms

embargo, however, P. W. Botha had already raised the possi-

bility of a more neutral stance for South Africa. After the

arms embargo was enacted, South Africa informed the West

that responsibility for the protection of the Cape sea route

would no longer be South Africa's. Significantly, it was

once again P. W. Botha who made the announcement, saying,

"no arms, no service."[163] Therefore, it is not unexpected

that the neutral option was given new prominence when Botha

became Prime Minister. There is also an apparent relationship

between the neutral option and the constellation, as South

Africa attempts to focus on regional issues. In March 1979,

Foreign Minister R. F. Botha stated "our sole commitment ought

to be towards the security and advancement of our own
southern African region. Southern Africa could steer a new
course of its own midway between East and West."[164]

While talk of the increased emphasis on neutrality
and regional considerations has increased, the effect of the
invocation of this theme in the international forum has been
slight. As Geldenhuys points out in his analysis, most non-
aligned states enjoy a measure of acceptance from both East
and West. South African non-alignment would be a new varia-
tion on the non-alignment theme: "based not on its accepta-
bility...but instead on its unacceptability."[165]

The fourth strategic option, alliance with other
middle ranked powers, has some international benefits for
South Africa. Between 1976 and 1980, South Africa exchanged
visits with both Israel and Taiwan, and signed a variety
of agreements for cooperation with these nations. While
the possibility or usefulness of mutual defense arrangements
between these countries appears slim, South Africa has gained
useful economic, technical and military benefits from these
relationships.

Another facet of the fourth option does not involve
the other so-called "pariah" states, but is the culmination
of what has been a major strand in South African strategic
thought dating back to the 1950's: the idea of a treaty
organization covering the southern Atlantic Ocean. As dis-
cussed earlier, it was this concept which involved South

Africa in the Simonstown Agreement in 1955, and which led to the first purchases of modern warships for the South African Navy. Since then, South Africa has continued to work to make itself an attractive defense partner, stressing the importance of the Cape sea route, and building naval facilities far in excess of its own needs in hope of attracting an alliance with a Western nation.

Failure to attract a Western partner probably caused South Africa to look elsewhere for security arrangements. It has been reported that in the early 1970's South Africa entered into a secret pact with Israel, Taiwan, Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay.[166] Whether or not this arrangement ever existed, the talk of it is significant in that it indicates that South Africa is moving away from the West in its search for security.

In addition, as South African power and confidence in its expanding military might grew, the Republic began to look more towards itself for not only self-protection, but for regional protection. In a radio commentary entitled, "A Monroe Doctrine for Southern Africa,"[167] parallels were drawn between the role of the United States in the Americans and South Africa in southern Africa. "As the most advanced and powerful state in the region, South Africa as a special responsibility towards it, as the United States has long had towards its own continent."

In summary, then, it is apparent that through the Total National Strategy, P. W. Botha has brought together

several strands of South African strategic thought. These

are a movement away from the West, the quest for alliances

among other middle power nations, and an expanding military

role for South Africa in the southern African region.

Internationally, the effect is probably seen as a very limited

increase in diplomatic flexibility for South Africa through

ties to other countries, and a further decrease in Western

influence as South Africa downplays (but not eliminates)

attempts to gain a western alliance and becomes militarily

more powerful and regionally more dominant. Most importantly

for Western interests, this redefinition of South African

strategy indicates a growing divergence between Western and

South African interests in southern Africa.

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III. SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY

A. THE THREAT

  1. Background

       South Africa's perception of the threat has developed
in a logical progression from 1960. As discussed in Chap-
ter I, the early 1960's were seen as the "Years of Crisis,"
and the specific threats were seen to derive mainly from
two sources: internal unrest, or externally supported
terrorism and guerrilla activity. Initial fears of an
external conventional military threat from black states
diminished as the strength of the SADF grew. Consequently,
prior to the Portuguese withdrawal, the organization and
training of the landward defense forces were aimed primarily
at counterinsurgency operations.

       Once these initial threat assessments had formed,
there was little apparent change in South African thought
until the 1973 White Paper on Defense, which introduced the
"Total Strategy" defensive doctrine. The initial develop-
ment of this strategy was done by P. W. Botha during his
tenure as Minister of Defense, and refined considerably by
him when he became Prime Minister. In spite of the new
widened perspectives put forward by the "Total Strategy,"
however, the major threat during the period 1973-1975 was
still seen to be guerrilla activity in Namibia and Rhodesia,

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and SADF training and organization continued to reflect the major role assigned to unconventional warfare methods.[168]

As in many other areas of South African history, 1975 proved to be a watershed year for defense policy. The independence of Angola and Mozambique put radical, black, leftist governments associated with the Soviet Union not only in southern Africa, but directly on South Africa's borders. At the same time, Britain abrogated the Simonstown agreement, which had for years been the Republic's only defense relationship with the West. While SADF training during this turbulent time continued to emphasize counter-insurgency tactics, preoccupation with a perceived Soivet threat began to become apparent in South African defense writings, and preparations were begun to meet a more conven-tionally oriented outside threat. The Army was reorganized under separate conventional and counterinsurgency commands as a new strand of thought on conventional warfare was developed.[169]

Since 1975, it has been apparent that South African strategic thought envisions a two-fold threat. The 1982 Defense White Paper discusses the threat in broad terms of the Marxist-Leninist onslaught against Africa, but specifically assigns both conventional and counterinsurgency roles to the combat branches of the SADF.

2. The Conventional Threat

In June 1979, then Chief of the South African Defense Force, General Magnus Malan, stated that "the possibility of

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a conventional military threat to South Africa in the not too distant future cannot be ruled out."[170] However, a review of the forces which could be involved in a confrontation between South Africa and any one or combination of the Front-line States show that with regard to equipment alone, South Africa is at least equal to, and in many areas, superior to all potential regional adversaries (see Table 7).

TABLE 7[171]

The Military Balance in Southern Africa

	Angola	Botswana	Zambia	Mozambique	Zimbabwe	Total	South Africa
Total Armed Forces	37,500*	3000	14,300	12,650	41,300	108,750	82,400**
Tanks	375	0	34	195+	28	632+***	250
Armored/ Scout Cars	200	Some	130	35	43	408	1400
APC/MICV	150	30	13	200	20	413	1700
Artillery (over 76mm)	200	0	128	250	34	612	230
Missile Armed Naval Vessels	2	0	0	0	0	2	11
Submarines	0	0	0	0	0	0	3
Combat Aircraft	67@	5	51	35	30	188@@	313
Helicopters	51	0	21	0	36	108	167

*Some 25,000 Cubans and 450 East Germans operate aircraft/heavy equipment. There are also Portuguese and 700 Soviet advisors.
**Potential for over 404,000 upon total mobilization.
***Includes some 385 T-34s of questionable value.
@Equipment totals and serviceability uncertain.
@@60 are MIG-17s of questionable value.

In addition to material considerations, a brief review of
many other areas related to the armed forces of these nations,
including sources of recruitment, military traditions and
backgrounds, defense infrastructure, and reserve organi-
zations would also indicate the superiority of the SADF.[172]

Another consideration in addition to the threat
posed solely by South Africa's neighbors is the perceived
conventional threat of the Soviet Union and its proxies.
South Africa has within the past several years expanded its
concept of the conventional threat to include the possi-
bility of an attack by Soviet, Cuban, or Eastern European
troops staging through neighboring countries and utilizing
prepositioned military equipment. In February 1981, General
Malan, now Minister of Defense, stated, "there is an unpre-
cedented buildup of conventional heavy armaments in Southern
Africa and should these be manned and used by Communist proxy
forces, it could very rapidly lead to a conventional on-
slaught against South Africa."[173] Further, in 1982, General
Malan said, "The presence of sophisticated weaponry of
Russian origin in South Africa's neighboring states indicates
that South Africa and Southwest Africa/Namibia could become
targets of a conventional onslaught."[174]

Finally, the possibility of a conventional attack
is seen in conjunction with other pressures. This type of
conventional threat could come in the form of conventional
force raids conducted in coordination with terrorist tactics,
and might include maritime actions.

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These themes have been discussed from 1979 on, and have received even more attention since 1981. Yet while planning to meet the threat of a conventional attack is apparent in the composition and training of the current SADF, it is also apparent that the possibility of a conventional attack has been used, in part, to justify rising defense expenditures, new security legislation, and in support of a new conscription law. It was in support of this law, which was introduced in 1982, that General Malan stated "the possibility of a conventional attack against South Africa is the main reason for the country's new national service system..."[175]

This use of the threat of conventional attack makes sense when viewed within the framework of justifying the implementation of various facets of the Total National Strategy, and in part explains the difference between South African statements and the real military potentials of the Republic's neighbors. What is probably a more accurate description of South African defense planners estimates of the conventional threat faced by South Africa was put forward by General C. L. Viljoen, Chief of the SADF, in 1983. In examining the conventional threat, he concluded that

> In light...of factors such as poor economic conditions,
> internal instability, relatively deficient physical
> infrastructures, the inability to properly maintain
> or to replace advanced military equipment and discord
> arising from old regional conflicts, the African
> countries (individually and collectively) pose no
> real offensive military threat to the RSA.[176]

According to General Vilojen, the real threat of
conventional weapons in South Africa's neighbors is in the
possibility of these weapons being provided to "terrorist"
organizations, and in the use of these weapons by host coun-
tries in defending "terrorist" bases and headquarters against
South African pre-emption and reprisals. The real threat
of conventional conflict in southern Africa is the threat
of South African reaction against "terrorist" operations with
conventional arms, or in the case of a "drastic escalation
of the East-West conflict..."[177]

3. The Terrorist Threat

Many observers of South African affairs see two
other types of threat to the Republic in addition to the
conventional threat.[178] The first of these is the threat
presented by internally and externally supported guerrilla
movements, such as UMKONTO WE SIZWE. The second is the
threat of internal unrest in response to the repression of
apartheid, such as occurred during the 1976 Soweto distur-
bances. However, it is clear that South African defense
planners do not make a differentiation between these two
types of threat. This tendency to group all non-conventional
threats under the general classification of a "terrorist"
threat can be seen in the statements of South African
government officials. For example, in 1981, the Chief of
the Army, Lieutenant General J. J. Geldenjuys, defined two
types of modern warfare, "insurgency or terrorist warfare,

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and conventional warfare."[179] Further, the missions assigned

to the Army, Navy, and Air Force in the 1982 White Paper on

Defense were divided between conventional and counterinsur-

gency (see Appendix B for a discussion of these missions).

Two points should be made about the South African definition

of the threat. First, the terms terrorism, insurgency,

insurrection, and guerrilla warfare are all used inter-

changeably by South African government officials. Secondly,

missions assigned to the armed forces also make no distinction

between meeting externally supported and mounted threats

and assisting the SAP in the enforcement of internal

security regulations. It is all assigned as counterinsur-

gency duties.

The tendency in South Africa not to differentiate

between the external non-conventional threat and internal

unrest, and instead to lump all forms of unconventional

threat under the heading "terrorism" is significant for two

reasons. First, this view allows, within the framework of

the Total Onslaught/Total National Strategy, a logical con-

nection between the communist threat, "terrorist" organiza-

tions, and internal unrest in South Africa. Once this

connection is made, it is possible to see internal unrest,

such as boycotts and the actions of labor unions, as occurring

not as a result of South Africa's internal apartheid policies,

but as a result of external interference from black Africa

and the Soviet Union. In 1981, Prime Minister Botha stated,

"...that within South Africa, Russia was providing the finan-
cial support for revolutionary organizations such as the
banned ANC and, in addition some neighbor states were allow-
ing terrorist bases on their territory."[180]

Second, this view of the terrorist threat as one
inspired by external interference as opposed to internal
policies has implications for South Africa's neighbors.
Ever since the initial involvement in Angola, South Africa
has justified crossborder operations as a reaction to dis-
turbances within South Africa. "It is the clear and repeatedly
stated policy of the South African government that it will
take whatever measures are necessary to counter political
violence. That policy includes striking at terrorists in
their bases wherever they may be."[181]

As long as internal unrest can be linked by South
Africa to intervention by its neighbors in the Republic's
internal affairs, justification can be made by South Africa
for a wide range of responses in self-defense. These
responses include escalation of violence from hot pursuit
operations, through pre-emptive strikes, up to actual occu-
pation of territory and the destabilization of neighboring
governments.

B. CONSTRAINTS

South African strategic thinking is influenced by a
number of important constraints. These constraints act to
limit the range of actions open to South Africa in responding

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to perceived threats. These constraints include those imposed by population, border vulnerability, international opposition, resource vulnerability, economic constraints, and by the perceptions of South African government officials themselves.

1. Population

South Africa is one of the most heavily populated nations in Africa, with a population of over 28 million reported in 1980. However, as Table 8 shows, the majority of this population is black. In addition, black population as a percentage of total population is increasing. The fact that whites make up less than 20% of the country's population has serious consequences when considered together with the National Party's apartheid policies.

TABLE 8[182]

Population by Racial Composition
1970 and 1980

Race	1970		1980	
	Population	% of Total	Population	% of Total
Black	15,339,975	70.4	20,609,000*	72.5
White	3,773,282	17.3	4,453,273	15.7
Coloured	2,050,699	9.4	2,554,039	9.0
Asian	630,372	2.9	794,693	2.8
Total	21,794,328	100.0	28,410,951	100.0

*Includes Transkei, Bophuthatswana, and Venda.

a. The Civilian Workforce and Apartheid[183]

Upon coming to power in 1948, the National Party institutionalized policies which were based on the view that black workers had no place in the white area beyond certain work levels. As a result, only limited training facilities were made available for blacks. As the South African economy expanded in the 1970's, the supply of white skilled workers dried up, and the resulting shortage of skilled workers led to the beginning of the abolishment of job reservations for whites. However, despite increasing acceptance of blacks in the skilled workforce and a depressed economy, by 1980, it was estimated that professional and semi-professional work sectors were short on the order of 5.6%, with the biggest deficiencies in middle management, artisan, and other specialist vocations.[184]

b. Military Manpower

By the beginning of the 1980's, it was estimated that South Africa had a potential military manpower pool of more than 5 million men of all races of military age. However, the Defense Act of 1957 limited mandatory military service to whites, reducing this pool to about 1.2 million men aged sixteen to sixty-five, of which 750,000 were of the prime military ages eighteen to thirty-five. As the SADF was built up to provide for both a larger conventional force and to meet the demands of the long term war in Namibia, South Africa's white manpower resources were strained almost

to the limit. The 1977 Defense White Paper placed primary

emphasis on manpower problems and on drawbacks in the man-

power system.[186] In 1979, some Citizens Force reservists

returning from active duty were ordered to report for an

additional tour due to an insufficient supply of new recruits.

In addition to an inadequate number of draftees,

other manpower shortages have affected the SADF. The Per-

manent Force has continually fallen short of its authorized

strength. In 1980, with 20,000 regulars in uniform, Permanent

Force strength was only 80% of its authorized level, with

the most acute shortages in the ranks of junior officers and

experienced NCO's. Continued shortages caused plans for the

formation of a Permanent Force brigade to act as a standing

force, scheduled for 1980, to be postponed.

The military and the economy in South Africa also

interact in two ways involving manpower. First, the SADF

suffers from the same skills shortages which affect the

private sector. The Defense Force must compete with business

and industry for scarce, technically trained personnel. In

1981, then Chief of the Air Force Lieutenant General A. M.

Mueller noted that the skills shortage in the armed forces

was affecting the ability of the services to conduct even

routine equipment maintenance. General Mueller pointed out

that much maintenance must be conducted by the private sector,

resulting in a further loss of skill by military technicians.[187]

In addition, much of the skills shortage in the military,

especially among pilots and aircrews, were due to the
ability of trained personnel to earn more in business than
in the SADF.

Second, serving National Servicemen were being
forced to do longer duty in operational areas in order to
limit the disruptive effects on the economy of mobilizing
Commando and Citizen's Force units. In 1978, a SADF[188]
spokesman said, "We are doing everything in our power to
cause as little disruption to the economy as possible. To
call up a member of the Commandos or the Citizens Force who
is already economically active will obviously cause far
greater disruption than by using men who are as yet not
actively engaged in the country's economy."[189]

2. Border Vulnerability

Today South Africa's borders are less secure than
at any time in the country's history. These borders cover
over two thousand miles from Atlantic to Indian Oceans,
and are shared with countries which have exhibited hostility
toward South Africa. The Portuguese withdrawal put a black
Marxist government directly on the Republic's borders when
Mozambique gained independence in 1975, and the election of
Mugabe in Zimbabwe in 1980 added another. Only in the west,
where South Africa borders Namibia, can the country said to
be bordered by a "friendly" neighbor, and even this could
change rapidly as a result of ongoing negotiations over the
fate of Namibia.

In reality, however, South Africa is not extremely vulnerable over the entire length of its borders. In the event of Namibian independence under a hostile SWAPO-dominated government, South Africa's border with Namibia would be protected in part by the natural barrier of the Orange River. In addition, the sparsely inhabited desert and steppe topography of this area would pose a serious obstacle to off-road penetration by any sizable guerrilla force.[191] In the east, the Mozambique-South African border near the coast is swampy and undeveloped, posing similar problems to guerrilla penetration, and making Swaziland a preferred passage for guerrillas from Mozambique.[192]

More dangerous are the Republic's borders with Zimbabwe and Botswana. While the border with Zimbabwe is protected for 125 miles by a thirteen foot high double fence topped with barbed wire on the South African side, the frontier with Botswana is easily crossed, especially in the winter months of June to September, when the Limpopo River is fordable at many points.[193] Any enemy force entering through Botswana would have easy access to South Africa's industrial heartland.

The vulnerability of Souty Africa's border with Botswana and Zimbabwe is of concern to South Africa for two other reasons. The first is the dwindling number of white settlers in this area. It has been feared that the departure of whites from this border would lead to the

opening of the much-feared "second front," as ANC guerrillas would be able to move from one black farm to another towards the country's northern urban industrial areas.[194] To counter this movement of whites, the government proposed a law requiring at least one white person live on each border farm.[195] Further, it has been proposed that a chain of fortified farms, settled by ex-servicemen, be established as defensive strongholds along these borders. To these ends, interest free loans have been offered to men with military experience to take up farming in key areas, and existing farmers given credits for occupying their property and managing it in accordance with Defense Force guidelines.[196]

The second concern is that presented by the "independent" homelands. As parts of South Africa near the borders are given over to the homelands, tough problems of border defense are raised. The homelands occupy strategic territory on the borders of South Africa, forming a semi-circle around the industrial and mining heart of the Republic. In addition, they are populated by ethnic groups that flow into neighboring states.[197]

3. International Opposition

As can be seen from previous discussions, South Africa's apartheid policies cause constraints to be placed on its foreign policies through the linkage between internal policies and external relations. Attempts to separate internal policies from foreign affairs, while a major focus of South Africa, have met with little success. The Outward

Movement, Detente, and the Constellation schemes made few international gains. In fact, South Africa's international options narrowed during the periods these plans were being implemented.[198]

Internal opposition to internal policies have had effects on South Africa in ways almost too numerous to count. These include sports, commercial relationships, diplomatic relations, and international recognition, to name but a few. However, several areas can be singled out for further discussion due to their impacts on South African defense planning.

a. Lack of Defensive Alliances

A strand which has run through South African foreign policy since 1948 has been the attempt to obtain a Western commitment to the defense of South Africa. In the 1950's it was support for MEDO, participation in the Nairobi and Dakar conferences with the colonial powers, and the execution of the Simonstown agreement with Britain. Since then, South Africa has continued to work toward obtaining a NATO commitment or the organization of a NATO style alliance in the South Atlantic. In doing so, South Africa is quick to point out its key position on the Cape sea route and its economic importance to the West. Naval facilities in the Republic have been expanded far in excess of domestic requirements and new command and control networks utilizing NATO-compatible equipment have been built.[199]

South Africa's Angolan intervention was a turning point in defense planning with regard to alliances. In spite of the fact that the efforts of the 1950's and 1960's did not result in any formal alliance with the West, until this time South African planning assumed the West would still provide aid if the Cape sea route were threatened. However, the lack of Western support in 1975 brought this assumption under question, and South Africa began to look elsewhere for security arrangements. On one hand, the growing military strength of the Republic caused it to become more self-reliant and less in need of Western assurances. Discussion turned towards the so-called "neutral" or regional options of South Africa.[200] On the other hand, options with regard to security arrangements with South American nations, such as Brazil, Argentina, and Uruguay were discussed.

And yet, in spite of the fact that South Africa seems to be charting a more independent course in defense affairs, it appears the SADF would still desire a Western defense commitment, if the price were not too high. As late as May 1982, as the Falklands War brought new attention to the South Atlantic, the head of the SADF, General Viljoen, called for a revision of Western naval policy towards South Africa, offering to resume the protection of the Cape sea route which South Africa had renounced in 1978 in response to the 1977 UN arms embargo.[201]

b. The United Nations Arms Embargo, 1977

By the time the UN's mandatory arms embargo was enacted in November 1977, South Africa had had a program to develop arms self-sufficiency for nearly 15 years. The South African response to the embargo was that it had a strong enough arms industry to surmount its effects. Minister of Defense P. W. Botha stated at the time, "We are self-sufficient enough, without great effort, to fight any non-conventional war against us, and with special effort, we can sustain anything of a conventional nature they can throw against us."[202]

In spite of this bravado, it is apparent that the embargo placed some limitations on South Africa. First, arms-related equipment and especially spare parts for equipment already in hand had now to be acquired through the black market, leading to higher costs and unreliable sources of supply. Second, the embargo denied to South Africa a narrow type of military equipment which it could not build for itself, but still desired to have. This included helicopters, long-range maritime patrol aircraft, large naval vessels and submarines, modern artillery, and some types of rockets and missiles. With regard to these types of equipment, South Africa was faced with the choice of doing without or of going to the expense of trying to develop variations of their own.

Finally, and perhaps most importantly, the arms embargo made the replacement of military equipment nearing

the end of useful life difficult at best. In retiring old Shackleton maritime patrol aircraft, South Africa was forced to modify some of a limited number of C-130 transports to fill the maritime patrol function due to the lack of a suitable replacement aircraft. As other equipment gets older, this problem will become more important to the SADF.

c. Resource Vulnerabilities

South Africa has always been quick to point out its importance to the Western world due to the great mineral wealth it possesses. However, there are two important resources which the Republic is lacking in: water and oil. Supplies of these two items either have been or could be subject to outside interference.

(1) Water. Water is needed in South Africa for irrigation, mineral exploitation, and the generation of hydroelectric power. Due to the fact that the region experiences frequent drought and possesses negligible surface water, large portions of South Africa are unsuitable for irrigation. This lack of surface water also affects trade patterns, as there are no navigable rivers in the Republic.

To make up for these shortcomings in water resources, South Africa has invested heavily in two major hydroelectric programs in what was at the time Portuguese territory. The Cunene River project, located in Angola

nine miles north of the Namibian frontier, and the Cahora Bassa project deep in Mozambique on the Zambeze River both serve South Africa today. As South Africa becomes more dependent on these projects for power, it becomes more vulnerable to threats against them.

However, South African dependence on power from these sources outside its borders also has implications for Angola and Mozambique. In the case of the Cunene River project, concern over the security of this project led to the initial South African presence in southern Angola in 1975 on the grounds of protecting its investment there. In the case of Mozambique, South Africa, Mozambique, and Portugal have recently signed the Cahora Bassa agreement whereby electricity will be supplied to South Africa by Mozambique. At the signing ceremony, P. W. Botha pointed out that the Cahora Bassa agreement was made possible by the Nkomati agreement signed six weeks earlier.[204] When it is considered that the Nkomati agreement was made possible in part by South Africa's destabilization of Mozambique, it can be assumed that South Africa would consider further destabilizations against Angola or Mozambique to protect Cunene or Cahora Bassa.

(2) Oil.[205] The 1973 Arab oil embargo against South Africa had less effect on the Republic than did the Portuguese withdrawal. In fact, the oil embargo was resented by the black states of southern Africa, which relied on South Africa for refined petroleum products, and was

not implemented by Iran, which supplied 90% of South

Africa's oil requirements. The cut in Iranian production

in 1979, followed by the overthrow of the Shah cut off

supplies of Iranian oil to South Africa, but by 1980, it

appeared that all of South Africa's needs were being met

thorugh the spot market at higher prices. In fact, produc-

tion of petroleum products went up between 1979 and 1980,

the last year energy related production figures were pub-

lished by South Africa.[206]

   In spite of the small short-term impact of

the loss of traditional oil supplies, the cutoff had the

effect of revealing a vulnerable aspect of South Africa's

economy. The more than 100 million barrels of oil imported

annually are crucial to communications, transportation, and

defense. In addition, the higher price of oil initially

available on the spot market increased the price of economic

growth, although this influence has probably been lessened

by the fall in oil prices in the early 1980's.

4. <u>Economic Constraints</u>[207]

   South Africa has a strong economy based mainly on

a super-abundance of minerals. Despite a dependence on

Western capital, technology, and markets, South Africa is

the most developed economy on the African continent, and

possesses the potential to become a leading middle economic

power. Yet, since 1948, the government's apartheid policies

have placed serious handicaps on the economy, and many of

the economic constraints under which the Republic labors are either directly or indirectly a result of these policies. In some cases, the effects of apartheid are obvious, and in others, not so. In addition, there are other economic constraints not related at all to separate development.

The following is a survey of some of the more important economic constraints which affect the strategic policies of South Africa.

a. Investor Confidence

The relationship between the economy and the political environment is important in all countries, but it is especially so in South Africa. Potential investors, foreign and domestic, must evaluate the impact of the various internal racial, social, and political tensions and divisions, together with the military and political position of South Africa in southern Africa before even considering the economic viability of the potential investment.

Moreover, the relationship between economic variables and the political environment in South Africa is seldom straightforward. When the economic and political environment are healthy, growth in the economy seems assured. Conversely, when both are not favorable, as during the 1975-1978 time period, growth is inhibited. In periods where economic and political signals are mixed, such as after Sharpeville in 1960, and in the early 1980's, economic growth has ensued, although the chance of risk was higher.

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b. Balance of Payment Concerns

Due to the limited size of its domestic markets,
South Africa is dependent upon maintaining a flow of exports.
The economy is vulnerable to reduced earnings and to shortages
of foreign capital, in that the South African government
has preferred to inhibit growth when faced with balance of
payments difficulties rather than rely on loans through
international money markets. Export growth is required for
continued expansion of import consumption and investment
expenditures.

An important factor in South Africa's import-
export equation is the international price of gold. One of
the major factors responsible for the recession in South
Africa in the latter 1970's was the drop in gold prices.
Gold fell from $161 an ounce in 1975 to less than $110 an
ounce in 1976, costing South Africa at least $575 million
in annual revenues.[208] Again, between 1980 and 1982, a
drop in the international price of gold from $613 an ounce
to $357 an ounce in part caused South Africa to experience
a large trade deficit and high inflation due to balance of
payments difficulties,[209] and ultimately led to a devaluation
of the Rand and cutbacks in government spending.

c. The Labor Force

As an industrialized, populous country, South
Africa's labor force should be an economic asset, and yet
there are a number of constraints put on the Republic by

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the combination of the composition of the work force and government policy.

First, as discussed above under manpower considerations, there is the effect of the shortage of skilled workers both in the economy and in the SADF. In addition to the considerations already touched upon, it is also important to note that as the SADF and the economy continue to compete for skilled labor, and as more whites are involved for longer periods in the military, the economy becomes more dependent on the black work force.[210]

Second, as the need for skilled workers grows, the government is forced to amend the apartheid system to allow the utilization of the black majority of the work force. In 1979 the Wiehahn Commission recommended the abolition of the color bar and the training of black apprentices in white urban areas. The political significance of these changes is two-fold. First, these changes have the effect of blurring apartheid in economic areas, altering relationships between workers, and potentially providing spillover in political areas. Second, as black workers become skilled and gain more income, their expectations grow as they gain more economic leverage.

Third, and related to the economic leverage being acquired by blacks, is the rise in black trade unions. The Wiehahm Commission conceded that all workers should have union representation, and the government has allowed the

provisional registration of black unions. While these
unions are heavily regulated, the implications are clear
and potentially disruptive. They include the use of black
union power for political ends and the danger of backlash
from white unions.

Fourth is the economy's dependence on foreign
African labor to work in gold mines where South African
blacks are reluctant to go. In 1976, foreign workers
composed a full third of the black labor force. The govern-
ment has tried with little success to reduce this dependence
by encouraging South African laborers to take jobs normally
held by foreigners.[211]

Finally, the inability to absorb the rising
number of black workers into the work force has led to an
estimated unemployed black population of between one and two
million, or about 10-20% of the work force. It is estimated
that South Africa would have to maintain a growth in GNP
of 8% a year to fully utilize this mostly unskilled excess.
This paradox of unemployment amid worker shortage does not
in itself inhibit economic growth, but has great potential
to be politically destabilizing.

d.   The Effect of Government on the Economy

The recent trend in South Africa has been away
from government interference in the economy. P. W. Botha,
as part of the Twelve-Point Plan, committed South Africa
to a free enterprise philosophy. Import controls were

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dismantled, foreign exchange controls relaxed, rent controls abolished, and limited labor reforms undertaken. And yet there are still government actions which have had major negative effects on the economy which must be noted.

First, the economic costs of apartheid has acted as a major inhibitor of economic growth. The effect of the lack of training programs and educational opportunities for non-whites and the effects of these shortcomings on the labor force has already been discussed. In addition, the actual monetary cost of supporting apartheid must be considered. The Rand cost of maintaining separate facilities for the races, enforcing security and influx control laws, and maintaining separate homelands which are not economically viable has never been fully calculated. However, one author estimated that in 1977 the cost of operating the pass system alone was 112,825,327 Rand a year.[212]

Second, the rising cost of defense has become an increasing drain on the economy. Even in 1981-82, in what was described as a "moderately contractionary" budget, defense spending rose 30% over the previous year.[213] Government officials justify these continuing increases by pointing to the threats arrayed against the country. In 1981, the SADF Chief of Staff for Finance, Lieutenant General W. J. Berg, stated, "It is important that certain matters in the budget must enjoy priority. Defense is one of these. The economy cannot be placed on a healthy basis if there is no

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peace and tranquility in the country and its inhabitants feel insecure."[214] In addition, the South African government has been quick to point out that at 3.5% of the GNP, defense spending is actually comparatively low.[215] However, the important points to be made are not related to the size of South Africa's defense expenditures when compared to other nations, rather how rapidly that spending has risen, and how it continues to rise in the face of poor economic conditions. The 1981 defense budget was 860% higher than that of ten years before.[216]

A final area which must be considered is the cost of stockpiling strategic materials. While statistical data on South Africa's oil consumption are classified under the Petroleum Products Act, it was estimated in 1983 that South Africa's strategic oil reserve equaled about three years consumption and represented the largest reserve of crude oil relative to size of economy of any oil-importing nation.[217] The cost of stockpiling, when added to the costs of other projects related to strategic materials, such as SASOL's coal-to-oil project, the continued search for domestic sources of oil, and the cost of the nuclear program, represents another significant drain on the country's economic resources.

5. Perceptual Constraints

As discussed by K. J. Holsti in his consideration of the foreign policy output of nations,[218] different policy

makers faced with the same choices under similar circum-
stances will react differently. This is the result of the
fact that many variables besides the immediate situation
affect the images of the decision maker. These variables
are the policy maker's beliefs, values, attitudes, and
ideology, and they are important in providing the framework
within which events are analyzed and decisions are made.

With respect to South Africa, the framework for
analysis and formation of policy is based upon the percep-
tions and beliefs of white South Africans. The ideology
which forms the basis for their perceptions is that of the
volk as an ethnic group with its own distinct religion,
culture, and political sovereignty.[219]

It is the survival of the volk which has occupied
Afrikaners for 150 years. The assumption of power by the
National Party in 1948 did not allay the feelings of concern
over the preservation of this identity. Instead, having a
majority in Parliament meant that for the first time Afri-
kaners would be able to control the government and ensure
the survival of the volk. As internal and external pres-
sures on South Africa have grown since 1960, the focus of
the South African response has remained the preservation of
their identity. The debate between verligte (enlightened)
and verkrampte (closed off) among Afrikaners is not a
struggle between liberal and conservative, but a more narrow
dispute over the means utilized to accomplish the same end.

Religious and legal principles form an important part of the Afrikaner world view. Maintenance of Christian values in the face of Western materialism and communist atheism is a real concern of the Dutch Reformed churches of South Africa, and a concern which is shared with many South African English-speaking churches. Regard for law and morality in international relations is included in Afrikaner University instruction. Non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries is an often-quoted legal principle, reflecting South Africa's disinterest in the affairs of other nations and the desire of South Africa to detach its own domestic affairs from its dealings with other countries.

Another facet of the concern with law and religion is a preoccupation with the view that South Africa stands alone as an isolated outpost of Western Christian civilization against a growing onslaught against these values. The communists of the Soviet Union are responsible for this attack, but they are unintentionally supported by other forces which weaken the Western world, including liberalism, materialism, secularism, and socialism. South African leaders take seriously the idea that the ultimate goal of the Soviet Union is world domination, and also apparently view other communist states, such as the Peoples' Republic of China, as acting as Soviet agents. The 1982 Defense White Paper defines the threat in these terms:

> The ultimate aim of the Soviet Union and its allies
> is to overthrow the present body politic in the RSA
> and replace it with a Marxist-oriented form of

government to further the objectives of the USSR, therefore all possible methods and means are used to attain this objective. This includes instigating social and labor unrest, civilian resistance, terrorist attacks against the infrastructure of the RSA and the intimidation of Black leaders and members of the Security Forces. This onslaught is supported by a world-wide propaganda campaign and the involvement of various front organizations, such as trade unions and even certain church organizations and leaders.[220]

It can be seen in a number of instances that South African perceptions have led to faulty assumptions about the country's strategic situation. These assumptions, in turn, have led to defense policies which, in light of real world events, did not best meet South African needs. As already discussed, during the period 1948-1960, many of the key strategic assumptions upon which the country's foreign policies were based, turned out to be faulty. Further, it was probably South Africa's perception that the Republic could count on support from the United States and from moderate black countries which led to increasing involvement in the Angolan civil war, with results which were plainly not in South Africa's best interests.[221]

C. ASSETS

   1. The South African Defense Force

       a. The Army

           (1) Organization.[222] The strength of the standing army of South Africa in 1983 was 67,400, including 5,400 non-white regulars, 2,000 women, and 50,000 National Servicemen completing two years of required active duty.

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This number is supplemented by reservists called up for periods of active duty of up to three months from an Active Citizens Force pool of at least 130,00 men. Reservists serve in the Citizens Force for 12 years, during which they spend 720 days in uniform, and after which they may be allocated to the Commando Force, where they are liable to serve 12 days a year to age 55.

In the early 1980's, the Army was restructured in order to counter all forms of insurgency while at the same time maintaining a creditable conventional force (see Table 9). To meet these requirements, the Army is subdivided into conventional and counterinsurgency forces. The counterinsurgency forces are further divided into nine territorial commands, each of which is responsible to the Chief of the Army. This force consists of members of the Permanent Force, Commandos, and a few selected Citizens Force units.

The Citizens Force provides the organization for conventional defense. For the most part, the Citizens Force is organized conventionally as a corps made up of two divisions (see Table 9), each with a number of brigades. Corps headquarters is at Pretoria and divisional/ brigade headquarters are staffed by Permanent Force personnel in main population areas. These units provide the cadres around which full scale mobilization of the Citizens Force can be accomplished.[225]

TABLE 9

Army Order of Battle 1979[224]

Conventional Forces

7th Division (Johannesburg)
  71st Motorized Brigade (Capetown)
    Capetown Highlanders (Capetown)
    Capetown Rifles (Capetown)
    Western Provinces Regiment
      (Stellenbosch)
  72nd Motorized Brigade
    (Johannesburg)
    Johannesburg Regiment
      (Johannesburg)
    1st Battalion Transvaal
      Scottish (Johannesburg)
    2nd Battalion Transvaal
      Scottish (Johannesburg)
  73rd Motorized Brigade
    Rand Light Infantry
      (Johannesburg)
    Regiment Louw Werpner
      (Landbrand)
    Kimberley Regiment
      (Kimberley)
  Division Troops
    Light Horse Regiment (AC)
      (Johannesburg)
    Capetown Field Artillery
      (Capetown)
    14th Field Artillery
      (Potchefstroom)
    7th LAA Regiment

8th Division
  81st Armored Brigade (Pretoria)
    Pretoria Highlanders (Pretoria)
    Pretoria Regiment (Pretoria)
    Regiment Boland (Pretoria)
  82nd Mechanized Brigade
    (Potchefstroom)
    Regiment de la Rey (Germiston)
    Regiment de Wet (Kroonstat)
    Witwatersrand Regiment
      (Germiston)
  84th Motorized Brigade
    1st Battalion Royal Durban
      Light Infantry (Durban)
    2nd Battalion Royal Durban
      Light Infantry (Durban)
    Prince Alfred's Guard (Port
      Elizabeth)
  Divisional Troops
    Umvoiti Mounted Rifles (AC)
      (Greytown)
    Transvaal Staats Artillery
      (Greytown)
    Transvaal Horse Artillery
      (Greytown)

Counterinsurgency Forces

Western Province Command (Capetown):
  Cape Garrison Artillery (Capetown)
  101st Signals Squadron (Capetown)
  Cape Corps Service Battalion
    (Eerste River)
  6th BOD (Capetown)
  Command Workshops (Capetown)
  2nd Military Hospital (Wynberg)
  3rd Field Ambulance (Wynberg)
  11th STD (Wynberg)
  Cape Flats Commando (Wynberg)
  Worcester Commando (Wynberg)
  Stellenbosch Commando (Wynberg)
  10th AA Regiment (Youngsfield)
  4th Electronic Workshops
    (Youngsfield)

Orange Free State Command
  (Bloemfontein)
  2nd Field Engineering Regiment
    (Bethlehem)
  17th Field Squadron (Bethlehem)
  35th Engineering Supplementary
    Unit (Kroonstat)
  Tank Squadron 1st Special
    Service Brigade (Bloemfontein)
  1st South African Infantry
    (Bloemfontein)
  1st Parachute Battalion
    (Bloemfontein)
  3rd Military Hospital
    (Bloemfontein)

TABLE 9 (CONTINUED)

Eastern Province Command
  (Port Elizabeth):
  6th South African Infantry
    (Grahamstown)
  84th Technical Service Corps
    (Grahamstown)
  11th Commando (Kimberley)
  East Cape Province Commando
    (Kimberley)
  Port Elizabeth Commando
    (Kimberley)
  Danie Theron Combat School
    (Kimberley)

Natal Command (Durban):
  5th South African Infantry
    (Ladysmith)
  15th Maintenance Unit
    (Durban)
  Tugela Commando (Durban)
  Umvoiti Commando (Durban)

Parachute Commando (Kroonstat)
School of Engineering (Kroonstat)

West Transvaal Command (-):
  2nd Signals Regiment
    (Voortrekkehoogte)
  5th B.O.D. (Pretoria)
  61st Brigade Workshop (Lyttleon)
  81st Brigade Workshop (Lyttleon)
  Pretoria Oos Commando (-)
  Horse and Dog Centre
    (Voortrekkehoogte)
  South African Military College
    (Voortrekkehoogte)
  Technical Service Centre
    (Voortrekkehoogte)
  Services School (Voortrekkehoogte)
  SAMS Training Centre
    (Voortrekkehoogte)
  School of Technical Training
    (Pretoria)

Northern Transvaal Command (-):
  Command Workshop (-)
  Frankfort Commando (-)

North Western Command
    (Potchefstroom)
  3rd South African Infantry (-)
  Command Workshop (-)

Witwatersrand Command
    (Johannesburg)
  Johannesburg Noord Commando
    (Johannesburg)

South West Africa (Windhoek)

In addition to organic formations, the SADF has been involved in the establishment and training of territorial forces in Namibia and in the "independent" homelands. In Namibia, the Southwest Africa Territorial Force (SWATF) was established on 1 August 1980 as a separate force under South African control. It consists of four area commands, North, Eastern, Central, and Southern, comprising 26 area force units organized along the lines of South Africa's Commandos. Air elements consist of one Citizens Force squadron equipped with light aircraft. In addition, the North Area force consists of six regular SWATF light infantry battalions and one mounted unit, and there is a mobile reserve brigade of mixed regular and Citizens Force units.

The first Homelands Defense Force created was that of Transkei. Upon "independence" the Transkei Defense Force (TDF) consisted of one battalion of 254 men, along with 30 seconded SADF Permanent Force officers. Relations between the TDF and the SADF were close until Transkei broke diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1978. Afterward, to counter a decline in the efficiency of the TDF after the departure of seconded SADF personnel, Transkei appointed Lieutenant Colonel Ron Reid-Daly, formerly commander of Rhodesia's Selous Scouts to rebuild the TDF. In 1982, the TDF consisted of a Permanent Force brigade of two battalions. The SADF still provides assistance with supplies, logistics, intelligence, and coastal defense.

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Bophuthatswana, as the second "independent" homeland also fielded an armed force upon independence. The Bophuthatswana National Guard consists of about 220 men trained by the SADF. Relations between Bophuthatswana and South Africa remain close, and the first Bophuthatswana Minister of Defense was Hennie Riekert, a former Brigadier with the SADF. The BNG is effectively a unit of the SADF's Northwestern Command.

Upon "independence" in September 1979, the Venda National Force combined the functions of army, police, traffic police, and detention services. This force is commanded by a former South African policeman, Lieutenant Colonel T. R. Mudautzi. In 1980, the VNF numbered about 450 men.[226]

(2) Army Equipment.[227]

Tanks	200	OLIFANT (CENTURION) MBT
Armored Cars/	1400	ELAND Mk IV/VI (Panhard AML-60/90) Armored Cars
Armored Personnel Carriers	1200	RATEL Armored Cars
	500	RHINO/HIPPO Armored Personnel Carriers
	280	SARACEN Armored Personnel Carriers
	230	FERRET Armored Cars (in reserve)
	50	M3A1/STAGHOUND Armored Cars (In reserve)
Artillery	125	25pdr Field Guns
	75	5.5" Towed Guns
	50	Sexton 25pdr Self-Propelled Guns
	40	155mm Towed Guns
	40	G5 155mm Towed Guns/G6 155mm Self-Propelled Guns
	Some	VALKIRI Self-Propelled 127mm Multiple Rocket Launchers
	Some	81mm Mortars

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              200    120mm mortars
              900    6pdr, 17pdr, M-67 90mm
                       Antitank guns
              Some   106mm Recoiless Rifles
               55    K63 Twin 35mm Antiaircraft
                       Guns
               24    L70 Twin 40mm Antiaircraft
                       Guns
               15    3.7" Antiaircraft guns

Missiles       54    Tigercat Surface to Air Missiles
               54    Cactus (CROTALE) Surface to
                       Air Missiles
              120    ENTAC Antitank Guided Weapons
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   b.   The South African Air Force

   (1)   <u>Organization</u>.   In terms of training, main-
tenance, and quality of personnel, the South African Air
Force (SAAF) is the most powerful in subsaharan Africa.   It
has a complement of 10,000 men, including 9,000 Permanent
Force regulars and 1000 National Service personnel.   The
Citizens Force reserve numbers 25,000, including many experi-
enced pilots and maintenance crewmen who are regularly called
to active duty.

   The SAAF is organized tactically into four
operational commands: (1) Main Threat Area; (2) Southern
Air Command; (3) Western Air Command; and (4) Training Command.
In addition, the Citizens Force operates six reserve squad-
rons with about 100 aircraft that can be adapted to strike
and Counterinsurgency missions, and the Commandos maintain
another thirteen squadrons of light aircraft.   Air Force
personnel are also responsible for the South African air
defense alert system and man early warning radars.

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(2) SAAF Equipment.[228]

Bombers	5	CANBERRA B(I)12
	3	CANBERRA T-4
	6	BUCCANEER S-50
Fighters/	32	MIRAGE F-1AZ
Ground Attack	22	MIRAGE III CZ/EZ
	57	MB 326 M/K IMPALA I/II
Interceptors	13	MIRAGE F-1CZ
Reconnaissance	6	MIRAGE RZ/R2Z
	5	SHACKLETON MR-3 (being retired)
	18	PIAGGIO P-166S ALBATROSS
Trainers	60	MB 326 M/K IMPALA I/II
	26	MIRAGE III (10 EZ, 10 D2Z, 6 R2Z)
	100	HARVARD T-6G
	12	C-47 DAKOTA
	30	ALOUETTE II/III
Helicopters	12	SUPER FRELON
	48	PUMA
	40	ALOUETTE II
	10	HAS-1 WASP
	27	ALOUETTE III
Transports/	7	C-130B HERCULES
Liaison	9	TRANSALL C-160Z
	7	DC-4
	24	C-47 DAKOTA
	4	HS-125 MERCURIUS
	1	BAC VISCOUNT 781
	6	MERLIN IVA AIR AMBULANCE
	15	AM-3C BOSBOK
	25	C-4M KUDU
	20	CESSNA CE-185
Citizen Force	96	MB 326 M/K IMPALA I/II
	15	L-100 HERCULES in civil service
Commandos		13 Air commando squadrons with registered private aircraft
Air-to-Air		R530
Missiles		R550 Magic
		SIDEWINDER
		KUKRI V-3

c.   The South African Navy

(1) Organization.[229] Originally formed to aug-
ment the Royal Navy in the defense of the Cape sea route, the
South African Navy (SAN) attempted to assume this role alone
after the British pullback from east of the Suez.   However,
creditable development of a blue water navy became impossible
after 1978 when France observed the UN arms embargo and can-
celled the delivery of two corvettes and two submarines.

Without access to more powerful ships and,
more importantly, with the shift in emphasis from open
ocean ASW to a mission of counterinsurgency patrols against
the possibility of hostile landings, sabotage, and attacks
on coastal traffic, the complexion of the SAN has changed in
the past five years.   British supplied destroyers and frigates
have been retired in favor of smaller vessels, and a 900
man marine force added to assist in harbor security.   In
1983 the SAN was manned by 5000 men, including the marines,
of which 2100 were conscripts, and 2000 Citizens Force
reservists.

The Navy infrastructure has also undergone
a period of improvement since the Simonstown naval base was
transferred from Britain in 1957.   In November 1969, the
SAAF transferred Langebaan air base to the SAN, and it
became SAS Flamingo air-sea rescue base.   In 1972, a new
base, SAS Hugo Biermann, was opened to accommodate South
Africa's new submarine force, and in March 1983 the new

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maritime headquarters at Silvermine was opened. In 1980,
SAS Hugo Biermann was enlarged, and the naval base at
Sailsbury Island, Durban was reopened after being closed for
23 years. Finally, establishment of the Marines in the early
1980's brought the development of a new marine base at
Simonstown, called SAS Simonsberg.

(2) SAN Equipment.[230]

Submarines	3	DAPHNE Class
Frigates	1	PRESIDENT Class
Fast Attack boats (missile)	8	MINISTER OF DEFENSE Class (6 SKERPIOEN SSM)
	3	(2 SKERPIOEN SSM)
Patrol Boats	5	FORD Class
	2	Modified TON Class
	30	NAMACURRA Class Harbor Patrol Craft
Mine Warfare	6	TON Class Minesweepers
	2	TON Class Minehunters
Auxiliaries	1	Fleet Replenishment Ship
	1	Ocean Hydrographic Ship
	1	Inshore Hydrographic Ship

2. The South African Arms Industry

a. Background

As has been previously discussed, the growing
pressures of the early 1960's, culminating with the 1963
voluntary arms embargo, had the effect of increasing the
desire of South Africa to become more self-sufficient in
defense equipment. By the eve of the 1977 mandatory arms
embargo, the combination of South Africa's arms production
using local design, license production, and embargo evasion,

coupled with weapons procured prior to 1977, offered South

Africa a moderate level of independence from external sources

of supply.[231]

b. Sources of Arms

After the second United Nations arms embargo,

South Africa continued to work towards self-sufficiency

in arms production. In 1977, according to estimates of the

South African Defense White Paper of that year, South Africa's

defense industry could produce military equipment adequate

for internal protection, but not that required to repel a

"conventional external threat."[232] At that time it was

estimated that foreign sources of supply were still required.

By 1980 new estimates showed that as a result of the con-

certed effort to mobilize the economy as a part of the

Total National Strategy, South Africa was considered to be

80% self-sufficient in overall arms requirements, and 100%

independent in infantry arms up to and including armored

cars.[233]

Since 1977, South Africa has utilized a number

of methods to manufacture or otherwise obtain end-product

weapons which could not be manufactured in the country.

These methods include:[234]

1. Transfer of Technology--In order to acquire the capa-

bility to produce an end-product weapon domestically, South

Africa could procure a license for production, and build

the capability with design and technical assistance from

the weapon's original manufacturer. Once the ability to produce a weapon is acquired, it cannot be withdrawn, even if the seller cancels the license. The Atlas Aircraft Corporation was built with British and Italian personnel and technical assistance.

2. Establishment of a subsidiary--A weapon supplier can evade the arms embargo by transferring an entire industry rather than just a weapon or license. This can be done by opening a subsidiary or branch office in South Africa. For example, this method was used by the British Imperial Chemical Industries, which owns 43% of the South African Explosives and Chemical Industries. South African Explosives and Chemical controls two munitions plants whose entire production is geared towards SADF needs. South Africa has also stated that, under South African law, foreign industries in South Africa can be ordered to convert production to military purposes if required.

3. Investments in producer countries--By underwriting the cost of weapons research and development in another country, South Africa acquires weapons and technology. The link between the South African CACTUS air drfense system and the French CROTALE are well known. The systems' characteristics were specified by South Africa, and the Republic paid for 85% of the development costs, working in conjunction with Matra and CSF in France. Other South African links with the French defense industry include procurement of MIRAGE aircraft and associated equipment.[235]

4. Defining military equipment as civilian--Suppliers
continue to deal successfully with South Africa in material
which lies in the gray area between civilian and military
use. This equipment includes electronics, radar and com-
munications equipment, computers, and dual use aircraft,
such as the Lockheed L-100/C-130. Utilizing "civilian
equipment," South Africa installed a communications system
useful in reporting guerrilla activities. In addition,
in 1980, air commando squadrons flying light aircraft pro-
vided aerial reconnaissance for army units.[236]

5. Exports of spare parts and equipment for maintenance
of military equipment--Although spare parts were covered in
both the 1963 and the 1977 arms embargos, no exporting coun-
try considered it possible or practical to adhere to these
restrictions. Not only was it regarded as contrary to normal
commercial practice, but enforcement was difficult at best.

6. Re-exporting of arms by way of a third party--Many
exporters of arms insist on provisions against re-export of
weapons in their contract. Some, such as Sweden and
Switzerland, do not. The Bofers and Oelikon antiaircraft
guns possessed by South Africa were not bought directly from
the manufacturer, but through a third party. This was true
for South Africa's TIGERCAT surface to air missile system
(UK via Jordan), Centurion tanks (UK vie Jordan, UK via
Israel, UK via India via an arms broker), and Rolls Royce
Viper engines for IMPALA aircraft (UK via license to Italy).

7. Dealings with other international "pariah" states--
It is interesting to note that the only major end-product
weapons acquired by South Africa since the arms embargo came
from another nation which has suffered a degree of inter-
national isolation. Israel provided three RESHEF class
guided missile patrol boats and the technology to build
more of these craft in South Africa. In addition, Israel
has transferred the GABRIEL surface to surface missile
(called the SKERPIOEN in South Africa) to arm these craft.
While relations between South Africa and Israel remain low
key, there have been reports that South Africa is interested
in acquiring the KFIR aircraft and other military equipment
from Israel in exchange for raw materials.[237]

8. Smuggling--There are a number of ways of smuggling
arms throughout the world, with or without the involvement
of the governments. While it is difficult to trace, it
seems that rather than drying up South Africa's sources of
arms, the 1977 arms embargo had the effect of driving the
market underground. There have been sufficient reports of
smuggling to South Africa to indicate that South Africa
is able to acquire most of the military equipment it requires
with little trouble.

9. Use of captured weapons--As the late 1970's and 1980's
brought a growing proclivity of South Africa to conduct
crossborder, offensive operations against groups such as
SWAPO, large amounts of military equipment began to fall
into the SADF's hands. Some of this equipment proved useful

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enough, or was captured in great enough quantity, to allow its adoption for use by the SADF. It has been reported that SADF units in the operational area have been issued with Soviet RPG-7 rocket launchers as an anti-vehicle weapon.[238] It has also been reported that South African artillery units have been issued with Soviet made antiaircraft artillery and that a training course in the use of this type of equipment had been instituted in South Africa in 1982.[239] Finally, it has also been reported that South Africa had captured a number of SAM-3, SAM-6, and SAM-7 missile batteries in raids into Angola.[240]

c. The South African Arms Industry and Self-Sufficiency

An examination of the SADF's requirements and the country's ability to meet these requirements leads to a categorization of weapons types and the steps South Africa has taken to acquire them:

1. Items which South Africa is producing, either as its own design or as a modification of imported designs. This includes armored vehicles, soft-skinned vehicles, small arms, explosives, artillery, most ammunition, and some types of missiles.

2. License built items incorporating imported designs and components. This includes light aircraft, combat aircraft up to the MIRAGE Fl, missile patrol boats, and some types of missiles.

3. Items in which major investments are now being made to design, develop, and produce local models. These may

be based on existing models produced elsewhere, but which
can be built by South Africa, including helicopters, heavy
artillery, large naval vessels, and multiple artillery
rocket systems.

4. Items which were acquired abroad and modified for
South African use, but which South Africa is not attempting
to build either because further procurement is not required
or because production of the item is clearly beyond South
African capabilities. This includes gray area items which
can be acquired as civilian use material, such as communi-
cations and electronic equipment.

5. Items which South Africa does not possess and is not
contemplating production of due to lack of production capa-
bility or lack of a requirement. This includes long range
maritime patrol aircraft, advanced avionics, electronic
countermeasure equipment, and major naval vessels beyond
corvettes and submarines.

It seems that, with some important limitatios,
South Africa produces or is able to acquire sufficient arms
to meet any credible or likely threat. Further, a good
indication of the country's self-sufficiency is the fact
that for the first time in 1982, South Africa attempted to
enter the arms export market. At first, during the Falklands
conflict, there were rumors that South Africa had supplied
Argentina with weapons and spare parts. Then, in October
1982, South Africa made a surprise appearance at the Greek

Defendory Exposition as the beginning of a major effort to increase the foreign sale of arms.[241]   South Africa offered armored vehicles, artillery, missiles, and a wide variety of small arms, ammunition, and electronic equipment.

   3.   Economic Assets

   In spite of the economic constraints on South Africa discussed above, the country's economy remains in many ways a valuable asset.   Natural and human resources, commitment to growth-oriented free enterprise, and the ability to attract substantial foreign capital have resulted in great economic advances in spite of the limitations imposed by apartheid and growing defense expenditures.   Further, the Botha government's attempts to mobilize the economy to support the Total National Strategy, as embodied in points 7, 8, and 12 of the Twelve Point Plan, have made the business sector a valuable ally in meeting the Total Onslaught. This economic viability has been useful in a number of ways as South Africa attempts to meet the "onslaught" and improve its international position.

   a.   Transportation Infrastructure[242]

   South Africa has the most highly developed transportation system on the African continent.   Internally railroads link all main population centers and are capable of moving large quantities of bulk goods over long distances. In addition, except in the lightly populated northwest, South Africa is criss-crossed by a dense system of modern,

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all weather roads. Externally, the country is served by six major ports--Durban, East London, Port Elizabeth, Capetown, Richards Bay, and Saldanha Bay--and a number of smaller ones. South Africa also maintains a claim to Walvis Bay, the only deepwater port in Namibia.

The transportation infrastructure is strategically important to South Africa for two reasons. First, the highly developed transportation system allows the rapid movement of SADF units in response to threats. Second, all of the states of southern Africa rely on South African transport facilities for the import and export of goods. Swaziland, for example, is dependent on the ports of Durban and Richards Bay for nearly all exports. This dependence gives South Africa a lever to use in relations with its neighbors. It also provides a buffer for South Africa against the threat of sanctions. As South Africans are quick to point out, any sanctions against South Africa would be just as damaging to the rest of southern Africa as they would be to South Africa.[243]

b. Strategic Resources

While lacking in oil and water, South Africa has proved to be a storehouse of valuable minerals. Mining accounted for 12% of GDP between 1972 and 1977. By 1979, this share had risen to 19% of GDP. Gold, Platinum group metals, and diamonds are especially important to the South African economy as major sources of income. In addition,

large reserves of coal and urnaium give the country an
alternative to oil in the production of energy. Finally,
South Africa possesses major shares of the free world's
known reserves of many important minerals, such as chromium,
manganese, antimony, copper, and titanium.

Maintaining access to strategic minerals has long
been a concern of the industrial states of the West, and
this in itself is an asset to South Africa. In addition,
these resources provide other benefits to the Republic.
For example, the value of gold exports in the 1970s in part
financed the military buildup of that period. In addition,
the employment of large numbers of foreign workers in the
mining sector provides the Republic as host country with a
certain amount of leverage over the countries which supply
these laborers. Mozambique, for example, is dependent upon
the income earned by expatriate workers for foreign currency.

c. Economic Strength

In spite of the economic constraints discussed
earlier, the fact that South Africa has the most developed,
strongest economy in southern Africa remains a valuable
asset for two major reasons. First, South Africa's strong
economy has allowed economic integration with Western
economies. Some 350 American companeis had a total of
more than $1.7 billion in direct investments in South
Africa in 1978, with outstanding loans and credits of U.S.
banks totalling another $2.2 billion. During the same time

period, South Africa was the recipient of 20% of all of the
United Kingdom's foreign investment.[244] This closeness to
Western economies is important in providing South Africa
with sources of international capital, and in providing
further protection against the threat of sanctions.

Second, South Africa's economic influence in
southern Africa gives the Republic further ways in which to
influence the actions of its neighbors. By 1978, South
Africa's trade with the rest of Africa totalled $1 billion
in exports and $1/2 billion in imports annually, accounting
for 70% of the GNP of the nations of southern Africa.[245]
In addition, South Africa is the primary source of imports
by neighboring countries, the main supplier of investment
funds and management skills, and a key user of both goods
and labor from black southern Africa.

4. Population Assets

While the fact that an oppressed, majority, black
population is a constraint upon South Africa, there is also
an important population asset which must be considered.
That is the unity of the white population when issues of
defense are involved. This is not to say that all the whites
in South Africa will be united behind the government on
every issue. There is a traditional split between Afrikaner
and English-speaking South Africans to be considered, and
the newer split between the National Party and the recently
formed Conservative Party. What is important within the

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context of South African Defense policy is how white
South Africans support the government on defense matters and
how willing white South Africans are to endure military
service in support of, as they see it, their way of life.

With regard for white support for government defense
policies, it is useful to examine a public opinion survey
taken by Geldenjuys in 1982.[246] This survey found that the
government's explanation of the communist threat was shared
by the majority of the white population. Further, there
were also indications that the majority of the white popu-
lation supported government defense policies such as cross-
border operations in opposing the threat.

In addition, white South Africans have endured an
ever-increasing burden with regard to military service with
little outward display of opposition. The amount of time
spent in uniform by the average white male has already been
discussed, but what is important to this discussion is the
fact that this increasing commitment has been accepted with
little opposition and minimal evidence of draft evasion.

This does not mean that opposition to government
defense policies and conscription could not increase in
response to increased pressure on South Africa, as happened
in Rhodesia in the waning days of the Smith regime. It does
mean that as long as the government can redirect, diffuse,
or effectively respond to these pressures, white approval
will probably remain high, allowing the government to rely

on a continued high level of support from the nation's
white population.

D. RESPONSES--SOUTH AFRICAN DEFENSE POLICY

In meeting the perceived threats to its security,
South Africa has taken a number of actions to ensure its
continued security. These actions are devised within
parameters defined on one hand by the constraints under
which South Africa must operate, and on the other by the
assets and strengths which South Africa possesses. These
actions in total make up South Africa's defense policies.

It is important to note that, in the case of South
Africa, these policies are not only designed to ensure the
survival of the regime, but the survival of the government
of the National Party and, by extension, the survival of the
Afrikaner volk. This includes ensuring the supremacy of
whites in South Africa.

For conveneince, actions taken by South Africa are divided
below into military, political, and economic areas. In
many cases it is problematical whether an action is classi-
fied under one heading or another, for all of these actions
are related and interdependent, in many cases overlapping
into all three areas. The classification is done for
convenience of discussion only.

1. Military Actions

a. Maintenance of a Strong Defense Force

The historical connection between the growing
perception of threat to South Africa which rose out of the

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early 1960's and the increasing strength and influence of
the SADF has already been discussed. Also discussed was
the changing organizational and training orientation of
the SADF in response to changing threat perceptions.
Finally, the strength of the SADF in comparison with the
armed forces of the rest of southern Africa has also been
noted.

Maintenance of a strong defense force is important
to South Africa for several reasons:

1. In view of the possibility of internal unrest, the
SADF performs important functions in support of the SAP in
enforcement of internal security laws.

2. In view of the hostility of the rest of Africa to
South Africa's internal policies, the Defense Force provides
protection against external attack, either conventional or
unconventional.

3. The SADF is also capable of carrying out a variety of
operations either directly against or in support of dissi-
dents operating against neighboring governments in support
of the political or economic objectives of the South African
government. These types of operations will be discussed
in greater detail below.

4. The strength of the Defense Force protects South
Africa from outside interference in South Africa's internal
affairs, allowing the Republic to institute its own brand
of internal reform without regard for the opinon of the
rest of the international community:

Another vital reason for the strength of the South
African Defense Force is that this country is
bringing about far-reaching changes in its Con-
stitution and is abandoning the Westminister form
of government. It wishes to do so without outside
interference, and today the South African Defense
Force is providing this country with the umbrella
of confidence it requires to bring about this
reform."247

b. Offensive Warfare--Crossborder Operations

In 1983, General J. J. Geldenhuys told a

seminar on revolutionary warfare that it was more economi-

cal to fight a terrorist war offensively than defensively.

"You don't win any war through defense...it is generally

more economical to fight a war offensively."248

Since 1975, the SADF has acted offensively by

crossing into the territory of South Africa's neighbors.

A variety of crossborder operations have been conducted

to achieve a variety of different results.

(1) Goals of Crossborder Operations. Attacks

on the territory of South Africa's neighbors can be seen as

having a number of different goals. First, and probably

most importantly, these actions are intended to cripple

the ability of guerrilla forces to conduct raids into South

Africa or Namibia by attacking guerrilla bases. In 1983,

General Vilojoen, Chief of the SADF, said he believed it

possible to prevent the ANC from intensifying a sabotage

campaign in South Africa by shuting the group's military wing

out of neighboring black countries, saying, "...if we deny

them bases in our neighboring states either through the

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cooperation of the states themselves...or by military action
against them, then they have only two ways to come in, by
air or by sea. It makes it almost impossible for them."[249]
Therefore, preemption to delay or destroy an insurgent
military capability is an important consideration.

Second, and related to attempts to shut
guerrillas out of neighboring states, South African cross-
border operations are intended to make a state which harbors
anti-South African groups pay a price for their actions.

> ...any government so misguided as to offer its terri-
> tory as a launching pad for terrorism against the
> south must accept the inevitable consequences...there
> has never been any doubt about these consequences.
> It is the clear and repeated stated policy of the South
> African government that it will take whatever measures
> are necessary to counter political violence. That
> policy includes striking at terrorists wherever they
> may be. The internationally recognized right of
> preemptive strike is a firmly established element of
> South Africa's defense strategy.[250]

In this context, then, crossborder operations are used not
only to hinder guerrilla operations, but to serve as a warning
to neighboring states not to harbor anti-South African
groups through offensive deterrence.

Third, crossborder operations are intended
to punish guerrilla groups and neighboring countries for
attacks conducted within South Africa. The Republic has
stated that lack of response to terrorist attack merely
encourages further attacks, and it is against this background
that South Africa has warned its neighbors against providing
sanctuary from which these attacks can be made. Therefore,

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crossborder attacks in response to attacks on South Africa are another use of this strategy.

A fourth rationale for pursuing crossborder operations is to demonstrate to South Africa's white population that action can be and is taken against the forces arrayed against the country. While this remains more an implied than a stated strategy, the National Party government from the time of Verwoerd has remained concerned about the confidence of the white population. Therefore, policies such as the growing strength and successful employment of the SADF, the growing independence of the South African arms industry, and the general ability of the country to "go it alone" are well reported in the South African press. As General Malan has stated, "no self-respecting country that had the welfare and security of its people at heart could allow terrorist organizations to try and jeopardize its future."[251]

A fifth reason for the use of crossborder operations is in the "hot pursuit" of guerrillas who have carried out attacks on South Africa or South African forces, and have fled into a neighboring state. South Africa maintains it has a legal right under international law to conduct "hot pursuit" operations as part of its right of self-defense.

Finally, crossborder operations have been conducted in support of political goals, such as in assisting

anti-government guerrillas in neighboring states, in support
of South Africa's campaigns of destabilization, and to damage
the economic infrastructure of other countries to ensure
their continued dependence upon South Africa.

(2) Types of Crossborder Operations. Just as
South Africa sees a number of different purposes associated
with the conduct of crossborder operations, so too does the
Republic utilize a number of different types of crossborder
operations. These can be classified as follows:[252]

1. Reconnaissance flights over neighboring countries, such
as those conducted routinely over the southern Angolan
provinces of Mocamedes, Huila, and Cuando-Cubango. The
purpose of this type of operations is to gather information
about guerrilla bases and movements. On at least one occa-
sion these flights have resulted in an air-to-air encounter
with the Angolan Air Force, resulting in the destruction
of an Angolan MIG-21 by an SAAF MIRAGE.

2. Air attacks and associated battle damage assessment
flights, either as operations in their own right, such as
the air raid on Maputo, or in support of ground operations,
such as during various operations in Southern Angola.

3. Small scale, commando type ground actions by the
Army, such as the raid into Maseru, Lesotho in December
1982, or the dramatic long-range attack on the Petrangol
State oil refinery in Luanda in November 1981. These opera-
tions are conducted by a combination of air, sea, and land
forces.

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4. Large-scale, combined arms operations in neighboring countries, conducted so far only in Angola. Recently, the forces involved in these types of operations have grown tremendously in size and capability. For example, Operation Protea in August 1981 involved the largest mobilization of the SADF since World War II. The force involved was made up of three infantry brigades totalling 11,000 men, three squadrons of MIRAGE and BUCCANEER aircraft, 90 OLIFANT tanks, heavy artillery, and 250 armored cars.[253]

c. Maritime Strategy

Landward defense has always received the major share of the attention and budget due to South Africa's perception of the threats it faced. Due to the lack of naval capabilities among South Africa's neighbors, it was logical that the Army and Air Force take precedence.

However, the role assigned to the Navy has changed the most drastically of any branch of the SADF since 1975. This change has been due more to necessity rather than choice. First, the unilateral abrogation of the Simonstown agreement by Britain in 1975 meant South Africa no longer needed to maintain a British style, blue water, anti-submarine warfare oriented naval force. Second, the 1977 arms embargo cost South Africa its sources of larger naval vessels and submarines, and caused the navy to turn to smaller, missile-armed craft which could be domestically produced.

Under these changing conditions, the SAN has evolved into a force oriented towards coastal defense, harbor security, support of counterinsurgency and cross-border operations, and protection of South Africa's offshore economic zone. Protection of the Cape Sea route was renounced in 1978 as a response to the UN arms embargo, although South Africa has since offered to reassume this responsibility as a consideration for Western favor. In 1981 the Navy added a Marine force to perform duties associated with harbor security and counterinsurgency operations.

2. Political Actions

South Africa has instituted a number of actions internally and externally which can be grouped under the general heading of political actions. Some of these actions were taken in response to a threat. Others were intended to deal with perceived constraints. Some have been achieved through military action, but are still part of a political program.

a. Effective Mobilization of Manpower for Defense

As discussed previously, manpower shortages affect the SADF's military capabilities in a number of ways. The nation's limited white manpower reserves limit the strength of the SADF, causes competition between the military and civilian sectors for available skills, and place a heavy burden of military service on the white male population.

In order to efficiently utilize the existing manpower pool, and to increase the size of that pool, the

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government of South Africa has taken a number of positive steps to ensure the manpower requirements of the SADF can be met.

(1) Conscription. In 1982, a new law affecting National Service was enacted. In this law, National Service requirements were increased from 240 total days to 720 total days spread over 12 years instead of over eight. In addition, all men below age 55 who had not previously been drafted or who had only one year of National Service became liable for 30 days basic training and 12 days call-up a year until age 55. As a result, it has been estimated that the pool of white males available for call-up would increase by 800,000.[254] See Table 6 for a survey of the changing service requirements for white males.

(2) Utilization of Non-Whites. In recent years, the South African government has taken steps to expand the participation of other population groups in the military. As already mentioned, coloureds have served in the SADF since 1963, when the Cape Coloured Corps was reestablished. By 1977, the government had accepted in principal the recommendation of a special commission of coloured affairs which called for National Service and a cadet force for coloureds.[255] In the creation of an Indian training battalion in 1975, Asians were also admitted into the SADF. However, induction of men of these groups remains limited due to shortages in facilities. In 1983, for example, the SADF accepted 153 of 608 Asians, and 1600 of 2300 coloured volunteers.[256]

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The arming of blacks has proceeded at an
even slower pace. It was noted previously that, in the
1970's, while Minister of Defense P. W. Botha was opposed
to the involvement of blacks in combat training. However,
by 1975, training for black volunteers had been instituted
in the SADF. By 1978 the Army's black complement had grown
to battalion strength, and the 21st South African Infantry
Battalion of 515 men with white officers had been formed.
This battalion has served on the Angolan border with
distinction.

In addition to the 21st, the SADF has also
trained six ethnic battalions of Namibians, which have also
served border duty. These battalions now form the SWATF.
Finally, the SADF has been involved in the training of the
defense forces of the "independent" homelands, which, in some
cases, are closely integrated with the Army's counterinsur-
gency forces.[257]

The issue still to be reoslved with regard
to the inclusions of non-whites in the SADF is that of
required National Service for Asians and coloureds now that
these groups have received their "political dispensations"
under the new constitution. In this question, Botha is
faced with a political tightrope. On one hand, he will be
pressured by whites to include these groups in mandatory
service once they have been given political rights. On
the other, prominent coloured and Asian groups, such as the

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Coloured Labor Party, which will have to support the new

Constitution if it is to have any credibility, have already

rejected mandatory military service until "all people are

free in a new South Africa."[258]

(3) Immigrants.[259] As the manpower demands of

the SADF increased, the government also began to look towards

immigrants as a source of men for military service. Until

recently, an immigrant to South Africa could declare he did

not want South African citizenship and thereby not be eligi-

ble for conscription without losing permanent residence

status. Pressures to involve immigrants in the SADF began

in the 1970's. In 1978, the South African Citizenship Act

was amended to reduce the period required for naturalization

from five years to two to make naturalized citizens available

to the Defense Force sooner after their arrival.

In 1984, the final step was taken in closing

what was perceived as the immigrant loophole with the intro-

duction of the South African Citizen Amendment Bill. Under

this bill, all aliens who have been permanent residents of

South Africa for more than five years obtain South African

citizenship automatically by naturalization. In addition,

the bill also provides that such aliens may declare they do

not want to become naturalized citizens, but by doing so they

will lose their permanent residence benefits. "Now immigrants

will have to make the same sacrifices as South African

citizens."[260]

b. The Search for Security[261]

As South Africa is a moderate sized power,
seemingly surrounded by potential enemies, a common element
of all past South African defense policies has been the
search for allies. As previously discussed, South Africa
has made strenuous efforts to find foreign allies. Since
1960, significant resources have been expended in enlarging
and modernizing naval communications, docking, and repair
facilities in hopes of attracting allies and gaining entrance
into a Western defense alliance. During the same period,
South Africa made attempts to persuade moderate African
states to enter into regional security arrangements, and to
advance the idea of southern hemisphere security among poten-
tial Latin American allies.

Undoubtedly, South Africa's preference would
still be a defense alliance with the West. The advantages
of such an arrangement would be the deterrent effect it would
have on the Soviet Union and Cuba, and on the anticipated
"Total Onslaught" directed against South Africa. It would
also show black Africa that white rule in South Africa was
underwritten by the Western powers. Finally, such an alliance
would have a beneficial effect on white confidence within the
Republic, and give South Africa access to Western arms and
military technology. However, it is apparent that potential
Western allies would demand a higher price in the form of
internal change for such an arrangement than South Africa

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would be willing to pay. Only the prospects of imminent collapse or a massive invasion would cause South Africa to agree to any major dismantling of apartheid.

While South Africa has apparently written off any chance of a closer alignment with the West for the time being, the prospects for regional arrangements appear to be improving. South African efforts in this direction have followed two different tracks. The more recent of these is Botha's Constellation of States, which was originally intended to include eight to ten southern African countries. This mainly economic approach also hoped for positive spillover into political and security functions. At present, the Constellation plan seems to have narrowed to include only South Africa and the homelands.

The other track was perceived before the Constellation, and can be seen as a logical continuation of programs aimed at black states beginning in 1970 with the offer of non-aggression pacts by South Africa, and continuing through the Outward Movment and Detente programs. These programs of contact with other African countries on the basis of economic and technical programs have continued at low levels all along. Further, as recent events have shown, when South Africa added destabilization in earnest to its programs in the 1980's, it was able to extract even greater contacts from its neighbors. The Nkomati Accord and Cahora Bassa treaty with Mozambique and the reported non-aggression pact

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with Swaziland are good examples of this new Outward Movement conducted by force of arms.

    c. Destabilization

    (1) Background. In early 1983, The New York Times quoted P. W. Botha as saying that South Africa would consider giving aid to anti-communist guerrillas in southern Africa if they asked for it, saying that if "fellow Africans were threatened by the evils of communism, then South Africa would assist them if assistance was required."[262] Further, in the same interview, he said South Africa would be willing to enter into non-aggression pacts with neighbors, irrespective of their political systems. These agreements would not allow either country to be used as a point of attack for insurgents. Finally, Mr. Botha denied reports South Africa was trying to destabilize governments in neighboring countries, but hinted that, if neighboring countries allowed terrorists to use their territories as points from which to attack, South Africa could do the same.[263]

    This interview provided an insight into South Africa's destabilization programs. The instruments used by the Republic in carrying out these programs were aid to anti-communist guerrillas and the use of South African territory as points from which to attack. South Africa's goal was to push the bases of potential adversary groups back from its borders: thus the offer of mutual non-aggression pacts.

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The pressures on South Africa grew in the 1970's as its neighbors acted in support of internal and external opposition to apartheid. South Africa rightly saw these pressures as attempts to destabilize the Republic. According to one South African analyst, the ANC made no secret of its aims to seize power in South Africa, and six black states in the region, Angola, Zambia, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Botswana, and Tanzania, were members of the frontline group dedicated to assist in this attempt.[264] However, South Africa also came to see destabilization as a two-way street, and became involved in actions aimed at improving its own security at the expense of its neighbors. As one observer of South Africa wrote, "The South African political system is under challenge, and the challengers of such a powerful system must accept the consequences of 'declaring war' against it...there should therefore be no surprise when Pretoria flexes its military and economic muscle against weaker organized opposition."[265]

(2) The Destabilization Program. The destabilization of its neighbors has become one of the most important South African concerns since 1978. However, it was in 1981 that this program apparently came to the fore. The increasing importance of this program was probably due to three separate considerations. First, the end of the 1970's brought P. W. Botha to power, which had the effect of increasing the military influence, through the new importance

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attached to the SSC, in the South African government. In

addition, Botha came to power with much of his potential

opposition discredited by the scandal which deposed Vorster.

This allowed Botha much leeway in the implementation of the

Total National Strategy.

Second, the defeat of the South African

supported forces of moderation in the form of Bishop Muzrwa

and the victory of Mugabe in Zimbabwe completed the encircle-

ment of South Africa and Namibia by potentially unfriendly

countries. Finally, the events of the 1970's had shown

South Africa that not only could the west and the moderate

African countries not be trusted, as exhibited by their

failure to support South Africa in Angola in 1975, but that

the SADF was fully capable of handling itself in confrontation

with black armies and the Cubans.

While crossborder operations from Namibia

into Angola had been conducted for some time, 1981 brought a

new dimension to the use of these operations. Operation

Protea in that year was more than a campaign to harass SWAPO.

It was a major invasion of southern Angola which established

South African military supremacy over much of southern Angola,

and allowed UNITA to expand its operations against the Angolan

government.[266] After 1981 it seems likely that South African

actions in Angola were not aimed at overthrowing the MPLA

regime or at installing a friendly UNITA government in its

place. It is more likely South Africa's interests lay in

economic dislocation aimed at keeping Angola on the defensive.

For its part, Zambia has been described by
South Africa as a center for subversion and as a "Marxist
satellite state engaged in Soviet-inspired conspiracy against
the Republic."[268] In response to the alleged Zambian threat,
South Africa has reportedly trained up to 600 Zambian dissi-
dents and been involved in at least two conspiracies in that
country since 1980. In addition, South Africa has also
engaged in economic destabilization against Zambia. Since
1980 direct attacks have been made against Zambian economic
targets from the Caprivi Strip, including one in April 1982
by two battalions of the SADF resulting in a decline in
agricultural production and a deterrence of mineral pros-
pecting in the area. In July 1982, southern Zambia was
declared a disaster zone, partly due to these deprivations.

Most incidents involving Botswana have
been clashes between Botsawanan and South African forces
around the Caprivi Strip, and attacks on South African
refugrees in Botswana. Protests by Botswana have elicited
little response from South Africa or, in some cases, simply
flat denial that any incident ever occurred. In spite of
these incidents, Botswana has not suffered the same kinds of
attacks that other neighbors of South Africa have. One
possible reason for this is that Botswana keeps tight control
over South African refugees and is careful to discourage
any attempts either to smuggle arms across the border to
South Africa, or to allow armed attacks against South Africa
or Bophuthatswana to originate in Botswana.

Zimbabwe is a special case for South Africa. It is the only state in the region in which there appeared there was a chance a stable, multi-racial society could be established. It has also been seen by South Africa to be the only state in the region outside of the Republic capable of becoming an industrial power. Shortly after Zimbabwean independence, South Africa transported a number of former black Rhodesian troops and ZIPRA guerrillas to camps in the northern Transvaal, from where the Ndebele language "Radio Truth" operates. In Zimbabwe, South Africa has also apparently been involved in sabotage, such as the destruction of two-thirds of the country's air force at Gweru in July 1982, and the heavy handed use of economic pressures, such as the withdrawal of railroad equipment needed to haul the country's record harvest in 1981. South Africa could hardly deny involvement in the so-called "month of the hawks" in December 1982, when the destruction of the oil depot at Beria by commandos, sabotage to the rail route between Maputo and Chicualacuala, and a suposed labor dispute on the South African railway lines to Zimbabwe all combined to put a serious economic squeeze on Zimbabwe. While fuel supplies eventually reached the country, South Africa made a point of just how much pressure it could apply.[269]

In Lesotho, collusion between the Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) and South Africa is an open secret. LLA personnel shelter in South Africa and must cross its

territory to make their attacks. South Africa has also conducted crossborder operations into Lesotho against purported ANC targets, such as the 9 December 1982 raid on Maseru in which 37 people were killed. Economic pressures on Lesotho, which as a land locked country entirely surrounded by South Africa is highly vulnerable, have resulted in the expulsion of ANC personnel.

Swaziland has, like Botswana, always been careful in not giving unnecessary offense to South Africa. Alarmed by the Maseru raid, Swaziland reacted by rounding up ANC refugees and either expelling them or removing them to a detention camp at Makerns.

Finally, South Africa's attitude towards Mozambique has been ambivalent. On one hand, when Mozambique achieved independence South Africa moved to help run Port Maputo and to upgrade its facilities. In addition, South Africa continues to accept 60,000 Mozambiquan workers, remitting up to $30 million a year in foreign exchange. On the other hand, however, South Africa has conducted raids into Mozambique, such as those in January 1981 on Matola and in May 1983 on Maputo itself. Further, there is little doubt South Africa supports the Mozambique National Resistance (MNR). At the time of Zimbabwe's independence, the MNR headquarters, personnel, and radio station was moved from Zimbabwe to a camp at Phalaborwa in the northern Transvaal. Since its connection was established with South Africa, the

MNR has concentrated not on establishing "liberated zones,"
but in the disruption of Mozambique's economy. It has con-
centrated its attacks on the rail line from Maputo to Zimbabwe,
on the oil pipeline and railway connection between Beria
and Mutri, and on the rail and road routes from Malawi to
the sea. These attacks, coupled with the current drought in
southern Africa and the mismanagement of the Mozambique
economy have all but ruined Mozambique, and in great part
led to the conditions which caused the consumation of the
Nkomati accord between that country and South Africa.

(3) <u>The Benefits of Destabilization</u>. In con-
ducting its widespread campaign of destabilization against
its neighbors, South Africa achieves a variety of benefits.
These include:

1. Improved security for South Africa as the countries
on its borders are put on the defensive and are unlikely
to be able to conduct any type of coordinated conventional
attack on South Africa. In addition, potential guerrilla
groups are pushed back from South Africa's borders, losing
support as countries such as Mozambique can no longer afford
the cost of supporting them imposed by South Africa.

2. Keeping South Africa's neighbors weak and economically
dependent on South Africa. Disruption of economies also
serves to discredit Marxism in Africa, thereby short-
circuiting the "Marxist onslaught." Finally, keeping its
neighbors weak and dependent on South Africa brings about
P. W. Botha's Constellation by other than voluntary means.

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3. The negotiation of the long-offered non-aggression
pacts with black states is achieved. These pacts have been
signed with Mozambique and Swaziland, and high level nego-
tiations have been underway with Angola for over a year.
These pacts not only increase South Africa's security, but
give the Republic a measure of long-desired international
legitimacy. It is not coincidence that a major Botha trip
through various European countries followed on the heels
of the Nkomati/Cahora Bassa agreements.

d. The South African Nuclear Program[270]

Whether or not South Africa has a "bomb in the
basement" has been the subject of much speculation since the
late 1970's. The alleged detection of a nuclear explosion
in the South Atlantic in 1979 has alternately been blamed
on India, South Africa, Israel, and Israel and South Africa
acting in concert. Conflicting statements by South African
government officials and the country's refusal to sign the
nuclear non-proliferation treaty serve only to further muddy
the issue. However, on at least one aspect of South African
nuclear development there is agreement. That is, that South
Africa has the capacity to design and produce nuclear
weapons.

Taken within the context of the Total National
Strategy, there could be two possible answers to the question
of whether South Africa does or does not have nuclear
weapons. First, evidence indicating possession of such a

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weapon could be a South African hoax, designed to instill doubt in the minds of potential enemies. Second, that South Africa does indeed have nuclear weapons. With the Total Strategy in mind, it seems likely that if South Africa were able to add yet another weapon to its arsenal it would do so, and if it were threatened enough, it would use it.

If it is assumed that South Africa possesses nuclear weapons, it becomes necessary to speculate on how and when it might use them. The following possible employment options are possible:

1. To meet the worst case conventional scenario, that of a massive Soviet intervention in support of groups opposing the government.

2. To use in a maritime environment against forces possibly blockading South Africa.

3. To use as a demonstration deterrent.

4. To break up large enemy troop concentrations threatening South Africa's industrial and population centers.

5. To use as a weapon of last resort, if the survival of Afrikanerdom were threatened.

6. To use as a tactical battlefield weapon in conventional warfare.

7. To use as a strategic deterrent to threaten its neighbors in the event of attack.

3. Economic Actions

There are three main thrusts to South Africa's economic actions taken in support of strategic doctrine.

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These are to maintain government integration with the economic

sector as called for by the Total National Strategy, to

increase the economic dependence of southern Africa on South

Africa, and to ensure self-sufficiency in strategic materials,

i.e., oil.

a. The Economy and the Government

Much has already been said concerning the

importance of the economy to the South African government

and the attempts of the government to further utilize the

business sector through the Total National Strategy. The

government relies on the private sector to increase economic

integration with Western economies, to provide contacts with

Western technologies and capital, to provide skill and capital

for the development of the Homelands and for economic con-

tacts with the rest of Africa, and to provide the research

and development for the growing arms industry. In addition,

within the context of the Constellation of States, the strength

of the economic sector is vital to provide economic links

within the southern Africa region.

In order to encourage the participation of business

in required programs, the government, under the Twelve-Point

Plan, has committed itself to a free enterprise economy.

Economic growth is stimulated by government action, with

recent trends towards a welcome deregulation of the economic

sector. Government action has also encouraged foreign

investment through programs such as the 1979 introduction

of the financial Rand, designed to permit nonresidents to import investment capital.

The Botha government realizes it requires the assistance of the economic sector to carry out its programs, and business has responded to this challenge.

b. The Economic Dependence of Southern Africa[271]

As seen previously, a major thrust of South African foreign policy for over two decades has been the attempts of the government to build economic ties to other African states and hope for positive spillover in other areas, such as political and security. To this end, South Africa has offered aid, capital, and skilled assistance to neighboring countries. It has also used the force of the most powerful economy on the continent to increase the dependence of other countries on the South African economy.

South Africa's regional domination is as pervasive economically as it is militarily. The Republic produces 77% of the Gross National Product of Africa south of Zaire and Tanzania, and makes up two thirds of the output of coal, iron, wheat, maize, electrical power, and rail transport. About 90% of the regions' energy consumption occurs in South Africa, and South Africa's per capita GNP of $2200 a year is three times the regional average.

The trade of all SADCC countries depends heavily on South Africa. More importantly, this dependence is all one way. South Africa has no reciprocal dependence on its

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neighbors, as its trade is widely diversified, exporting less to all of Africa than to Britain or Switzerland and importing an insignficant amount from its neighbors.

As a result of the economic power of South Africa, the dream of an anti-South African regional economic community will remain a dream. South Africa will continue to dominate the region's economic activity, and will continue to possess and use powerful economic weapons against its neighbors in the context of the Total National Strategy.

c. Self-Sufficiency in Strategic Materials

As the 1973 Arab oil embargo pointed out, South Africa was vulnerable to disruption in its energy supply. Since the enactment of that embargo, South Africa has taken steps to reduce its dependence on foreign sources of energy. These steps have been varied, and include several major programs.

The first response to the embargo was stockpiling of oil. As previously noted, in 1983 it was speculated that South Africa had amassed a strategic oil reserve equal to three years normal consumption.[272] This meant that South Africa had more oil in reserve relative to the size of its economy than any other oil importing nation.

Second, South Africa has continued to seek domestic sources of oil. For several years the government has financed the exploration of the SOEKOR company, which has been drilling both within the country and in offshore waters. In 1982, these efforts resulted in the discovery

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of a "promising" find at an offshore site south of Mossel Bay in the Indian Ocean.[273] However, the search for a commercially exploitable discovery has still failed to reveal a reliable source of oil.

To counteract the lack of domestic oil sources, South Africa has turned to alternative forms of energy. As a large producer of coal, the Republic has established a large coal fired power industry. Additionally, new sources of hydroelectric power have been obtained through deals with neighboring countries for South African investment, such as the Cahora Bassa project in Mozambique. Finally, South Africa has long been involved in programs to obtain oil from coal. In 1950, SASOL I was constructed, and production of 4500-5000 barrels of oil a day was begun in 1955. SASOL II, announced in 1974, was recently scheduled to come on line with a capacity of 45,000 barrels a day. In 1979, further plans were announced for the construction of SASOL III.[274] SASOL I and II are expected to provide one third of the country's fuel needs by the mid-1980's.

South Africa has also turned to nuclear power. A nuclear power station was begun at Koeburg in 1976, consisting of two French-built 922 megawatt reactors. In spite of sabotage to the installation in 1982, the Koeburg station was able to start up on 14 March 1984.[275]

Finally, in its quest for energy sources, South Africa has turned to new technologies beyond the coal to oil

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conversion process. In 1981, it was announced that the country would install the largest solar energy system in the southern hemisphere at Betty's Bay to power telecommunications installations.[276]

IV. CONCLUSIONS

South African strategic doctrine developed in response to a set of threats, constraints, and assets which are inherent in the nature of the South African physical, social, economic, political, and defense situation. While the roots of this doctrine can be traced back to the 1950's and 1960's, its present character has been shaped primarily by rapid changes in the country's position caused by the increasing pressures of the 1970's.

The pattern of South Africa's actions over the past 36 years is one of both constancy and change. The constants of strategy derive from enduring constraints and threats, such as manpower limitations, the country's population makeup, and its geographic position, and in the white commitment to apartheid. Changes have been linked to new perceptions of threats, assets, or constraints. These include the growing strength of the SADF, changes in the political shape of southern Africa, and the success of some of South Africa's policies, such as destabilization.

Despite many flaws in South African strategic thinking over the past twenty-five years, South Africa has shown itself able to rapidly adapt to changes in its position and to the threats and opportunities it perceives. These changes have ranged from the disruption of oil supplies, to growing

international pressures, to almost overnight change in the governments of southern Africa. Especially since the assumption of power of P. W. Botha, South Africa has acted and reacted to new threats and changing circumstances forcefully, vigorously, and independently, and South African policies have become increasingly tough, flexible, and aggressive. Based on the apparent success of these policies, it seems likely that in the short term, South Africa will move in new, more independent directions. The implications for the West are clear. As the Republic perceives its best opportunities are related to "going it alone," and as its capability to do so increases, Western countries will have less opportunity to influence the direction of South Africa's policies.

For South Africa, in spite of its new aggressiveness and growth in capability, as long as apartheid remains the main factor in the country's ideology and institutions, the range of choices available to planners will become more limited, and the use of the military will probably become even more attractive.

APPENDIX A

THE 12-POINT PLAN

The 12-point plan, as spelled out by Mr. P. W. Botha in his address to the National Party Congress in Durban on 15 August 1979, reads as follows:

Point 1: The recognition and acceptance of the existence of multinationalism and of minorities in the Republic of South Africa.

Point 2: The acceptance of vertical differentiation with a built-in principle of self-determination at as many levels as possible.

Point 3: The establishment of constitutional structures which make provision for the complete independence of the various black nations in the RSA, meaningful consolidation of the black states and areas and the acceptance of a socio-economic programme directed at the development of such black states and areas.

Point 4: The willingness to cooperate as equals and to consult on matters of common interest, with a balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community, and the removal of hurtful unnecessary discriminatory measures.

Point 5: The acceptance of the principle that where at all possible each population group should have its own schools and live in its own community as being fundamental to social contentment. In my view this is not discrimination, it is the recognition of each others' rights. The preparedness to consult as equals on matters of common interest with a sound balance between the rights of the individual and those of the community.

Point 6: I have said that those discriminatory measures that are unnecessary and create bad feeling should be removed...But I am not in favour of a system of compulsory integration in South Africa, and I am not in favour of endangering my own people's right to self-determination.

Point 7:   The recognition of economic interdependence
             and the properly planned utilisation of
             manpower.

Point 8:   Development of peaceful constellation of
             Southern Afircan states with respect for
             each other's cultures, traditions and ideals.
             To talk of a federation or a confederation at
             this stage would, in my view, be premature.
             A pact between states becomes possible only
             when the will is there. One first has to make
             all those states equal through independence,
             and then leave it to them to decide what they
             want to belong to.

Point 9:   South Africa's firm determination to defend
             itself against interference from outside
             in every possible way. And allow me to say
             here tonight, not boastfully, but we are
             better able tonight to defend South Africa
             militarily than ever before in the country's
             history. And I want to warn those who think
             that we practise our politics from a position
             of weakness: We are not speaking from a
             position of weakness, we are speaking from a
             position of decency. If they want to test us,
             our strength, we will hit back for the sake
             of South Africa's self-respect.

Point 10:   As far as possible, a policy of neutrality in
             the conflict between super powers, with
             priority given to Southern African interests.

Point 11:   The maintenance of effective decision-making
             by the State, which rests on a strong Defence
             Force to guarantee orderly government as well
             as efficient, clean administration. Clean
             administration is essential at all levels.
             And strong security forces with contented members
             are of the utmost importance in today's dangerous
             world.

Point 12:   The maintenance of free enterprise as the
             basis of our economic and financial policy.
             This also presupposes the most effective
             training and utilisation of manpower.

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APPENDIX B

MISSIONS OF THE SADF AS DEFINED IN THE
1982 WHITE PAPER ON DEFENSE

	Conventional	Counterinsurgency	Other
Army	1. Maintain a balanced and prepared land force in order to discourage or repulse conventional, semi-conventional or insurgency attacks against the RSA and SWA.		1. Create goodwill and establish & maintain sound relations with other population groups in areas where an Army presence is maintained.
	2. Conventional war-fare training to increase readiness of the conventional force.	2. Preparation of a COIN Force for anti-terrorist operations in RSA. 3. Area protection by Commandos for protection, intelligence, early warning and initial operations until additional forces arrive. 4. Support of the SAP in combatting terrorism.	
Air Force	1. Ensure safety of SWA Territory. 2. Provide air cover. 3. Air traffic, air defense, and air defense artillery coordination by air space control. 4. Point defense of vital areas by Missile/AAA systems.	1. Provide air support to the SA army, SAP and SAR Railway Police during COIN and other Security Force actions. 2. Ensure safety of SWA territory. 3. Conduct pre-emptive strikes. 4. Provide air reconnais-sance.	1. Carry out air-sea rescue in Southern Atlantic and Indian Ocean. 2. Provide assist-ance to other government departments by providing air transport. 3. Air support for anti-crime operations.

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Navy			
1.	Ensure right of RSA to use surrounding waters and deny their use to enemies.	1. Training of marine element and rotation of the units to the operational area.	1. Promote maritime cooperation with other states.
2.	Safeguard RSA's marine assets.	2. Protection of national key point harbors and harbor installations.	
3.	Defense of RSA coastline and and harbors.		
4.	Maritime reconnaissance of offshore areas.		
5.	Exercise of authority in territorial waters and economic exploitation zone.		
6.	Exercise right of peaceful passage through international waters.		

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APPENDIX C

MILITARY EQUIPMENT PRODUCED IN SOUTH AFRICA[277]

Equipment	Producer	Remarks
MIRAGE F-1AZ	Atlas	Ordered from France for local assembly by Atlas; eventually to be totally manufactured in South Africa; run of 100 expected.
MB-326M IMPALA I/ MB-326K IMPALA II	Atlas	Built under license from Aermacchi of Italy.
C-4M KUDU	Atlas	General purpose light transport; derivative of Italian Aermacchi AM-3C
Helicopters	N.A.	ARMSCOR announces in September 1983 that South Africa possessed the capability to produce helicopters and that Atlas aviation would be organized to build them in the near future.[278]
MINISTER OF DEFENSE missile attack boats	Durban Shipyard	Israeli RESHEF class; three were built in Haifa by Israel, eight additional to be built at Durban.
Harbor patrol craft	N.A.	9 meter patrol boats
AML-60/90 (Panhard) ELAND armored cars	Sandock-Austral Beperk, Ltd.	800 vehicles produced under French license 1961-72; South African version of French armored car.
RATEL MICV	N.A.	Designed and manufactured in South Africa; combination armored car and armored personnel carrier; first introduced in 1976.
RHINO/HIPPO armored personnel carrier	N.A.	Designed and manufactured in South Africa; Mine resistant armor and wheels; HIPPO is South African police version.

G5 155mm Towed Howitzer[279]	Krygkor	Medium towed howitzer
G6 155mm Self-Propelled Howitzer	Krygkor	Introduced September 1982. Designed in Canada by now defunct Space Research Corporation.
OLIFANT MBT	N.A.	South Africa claims all that remains of its obsolete CENTURIONS are the hull and turret, and that it has been upgunned, re-engined, and equipped with improved fire control, transmission, drive, and suspension.[280]
VALKIRI 127mm Multiple Rocket Launcher	Kentron	Based on captured Soviet BM-21; designed and produced in South Africa.
81mm Mortars	N.A.	
120mm Mortars	N.A.	
12.7mm Light Antiaircraft Guns	N.A.	
FN 7.62mm and R1 Automatic Rifles	N.A.	Manufactured in South Africa under Belgian license.
R4 5.56mm Asault Rifle	N.A.	Based on Israeli GALIL[281]
CACTUS SAM	N.A.	Developed and built in France as CROTALE, but 85% of research and development funded by South Africa.
SKERPIOEN SSM	N.A.	Based on Israeli GABRIEL with equivalent performance. How much of SKERPIOEN is built domestically is unclear.[282]
KUKRI V3B Air-to-Air Missile	Kentron	SIDEWINDER type missile; developed in South Africa, made available for export in 1982.[283]

WEAPONS/EQUIPMENT FROM EXTERNAL SOURCES

Equipment	Origin	Number in Inventory	Remarks
BAC CANBERRA B(1)12, T-4	UK	5 B(1)12 3 T-4	
Hawker-Siddeley BUCCANEER S-50	UK	6	Sixteen Delivered in 1965.
Dassault MIRAGE III CZ/EZ	FRANCE	22	
Dassault MIRAGE RZ/R2Z	FRANCE	6	
Dassault MIRAGE F-1CZ	FRANCE	13	Imported complete 1974-75.
Hawker-Siddeley SHACKLETOWN MR-3	UK	5	Have undergone service life extension in South Africa.
Piaggio P-166S	ITALY	18	9 delivered 1969, 9 1973-74.
Dassault MIRAGE III BZ/DZ/D1Z	FRANCE	16	
BAC VISCOUNT 781	UK	1	
Hawker-Siddeley HS-125	UK	4	
Lockheed C-130B HERCULES	U.S.	7	Delivered in 1963.
McDonnel-Douglas C-47B DAKOTA	U.S.	36	
McDonnel-Douglas DC-4	U.S.	7	
Swearington MERLIN	UK	7	Delivered 1975-76.

Transall C-160Z	FRANCE	9	Delivered 1969-70.
Rockwell T-6 HARVARD	U.S.	110	
Aeritala AM-3C BOSBOK	ITALY	36	
Cessena CE-185	U.S.	20	
Aerospatiale SA-316 ALOUETTE III	FRANCE	40	Unconfirmed reports of an additional 20 delivered in 1975.
Aerospatiale SA-321L SUPER FRELON	FRANCE	12	16 delivered 1966-67.
Aerospatiale SA-330 PUMA	FRANCE	48	20 delivered 1970-71; 20 delivered 1975.
Westland HAS-1 WASP	UK	10	
DAPHNE class submarine	FRANCE	3	Launched 1969-70
PRESIDENT class Frigate	UK	1	Launched 1962. Last of 3.
MINISTER OF DEFENSE class Fast Attack Boat	Israel	3	Built at Haifa. Additional units have been built by South Africa at Durban.
FORD class Large Patrol Craft	UK	5	Transferred 1954-59.
TON class Patrol Craft, Minesweeps, Minehunters	UK	10	Purchased 1957-59.
Replenishment Ship	DENMARK	1	Purchased 1965.
Survey Ship	UK	1	Transferred 1969.
Survey Ship	UK	1	Transferred 1978.
OLIPHANT/CENTURION MBT	VArious	200 (approx.)	Reworked/regunned in South Africa; 168 delivered from UK between 1955-59; 100 sold to Switzerland

			1960-61; 32 received from Israel 1962; 41 received from Jordan 1974; 60 obtained from India via an arms broker 1978.
COMET MBT	UK	20	40 delivered 1950.
FERRET Armored Car	UK	230	Delivered 1963-64.
M3A1 Armored Car	U.S.	50	Delivered 1957-58.
M-6 STAGHOUND Armored Car	U.S.	N.A.	
SARACEN Armored Personnel Carrier	UK	250	Delivered 1956-60. Now used by South African Police.
25pdr. Field Gun	UK	125	
SEXTON 25pdr Self-Propelled Gun	UK	50	
5.5" Field Gun	UK	75	
155mm Towed Gun	UK	40	
Oerlikon 35mm Antiaircraft Gun	SWITZERLAND	55	
Bofers 40mm Antiaircraft Gun	UK	25	Obtained early 1960's; manufactured by British firm under license from Sweden.
M67 90mm, 6pdr, 17pdr Antitank Guns	UK	900	
CACTUS (CROTALE) SAM	FRANCE	18	Three Batteries delivered 1971-73.
TIGERCAT SAM	JORDAN	54	UK system; obtained from Jordan.
ENTAC MGM-32 Anti-tank Missile	FRANCE	N.A.	
GABRIEL SSM	ISRAEL	N.A.	
R-530 Air-to-Air Missile	FRANCE	96	Delivered 1963.

MAGIC R-550 Air-to-Air Missile	FRANCE	N.A.	Reported to be on order.
AS-20/30 Air-to-Ground Missile	FRANCE	60	Delivered 1965-66.

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
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